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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The voice of Lester Holt rings out on Dateline NBC, “It’s a battle that 
can cause the most bitter anger, the deepest heartbreak: the vicious tug-of-
war over a child.”1  The story of John Wyatt, a twenty-three year old unwed 
father begins to unfold.2  John and Colleen were high school sweethearts 
who continued to date into college and were even talking about marriage.3  
Things changed forever when the two found out Colleen was pregnant.4  
John was only nineteen at the time, but determined to raise the child.5  
Adoption was never mentioned until the ninth month of the pregnancy when 
John found out Colleen had contacted an adoption agency in Utah.6  John 
was shocked, but Colleen promised him they would make the decision 
together when the baby was born.7  A while later, John could not reach 
Colleen for two days, until he learned Colleen was in the hospital and had 
given birth to his baby girl.8  John went to the hospital, only to learn that 
Colleen left out the side door.9  After weeks of searching, John discovered 
that the baby had been placed for adoption with a couple in Utah, despite his 
lack of consent.10 
John got a lawyer and went to court to fight for custody of his daughter 
a week after the birth.11  However, since the baby was in Utah, John missed 
Utah’s deadline to contest the adoption.12  The Utah court would not 
recognize the Virginia court’s order and months of uncertainty followed.13  
The final blow came to John on July 19, 2011, when the Utah Supreme 
Court found John waived his right to assert his parental rights by failing to 
raise the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)14 in the lower court.15  
 
 1. Dateline NBC: A Father’s Fight; John Wyatt’s Struggle to Get Custody of Baby Daughter He 
Never Had Opportunity to Meet (NBC television broadcast Aug. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032600/vp/44209050# [hereinafter A Father’s Fight]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006). 
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John is now left with the unlikely chance of the United States Supreme 
Court taking up his case in order to get custody of his now two-and-a-half-
year-old daughter.16  John is also suing the adoptive parents, their attorney, 
and the adoption agency in a civil suit, claiming fraud, denial of civil rights, 
and kidnapping.17  However, the best outcome would only be monetary 
damages, not custody of the daughter whom John so desperately wants.18  
Despite this uphill battle, John refuses to stop fighting: “Till my heart stops 
beating.  I will never give up.  Not until the day I die.  I will never give 
up.”19 
Unfortunately stories like John’s are not unique, going back to the 
highly publicized and dramatic “Baby Jessica”20 and “Baby Richard”21 cases 
in the 1990s.  The PKPA was passed in 1980, over thirty years ago, yet 
confusion about how its various provisions should be interpreted and applied 
remains.22  One key provision to interpret is jurisdiction23 and whether it is 
waivable by the parties.24 
The PKPA was designed to prevent parents from attempting to “forum 
shop” to gain advantage in custody disputes.25  In our increasingly mobile 
society, more and more custody disputes involve multiple states, all claiming 
an interest in resolution of the dispute.26  The Utah Supreme Court’s 
 
 15.  A Father’s Fight, supra note 1.  The Utah Supreme Court’s decision was J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. 
(In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 F.3d 702 (Utah 2011). 
 16.  A Father’s Fight, supra note 1.  The chances of this are slim, first because the Supreme 
Court is reluctant to rule on issues of family law.  See infra note 45 and accompanying text.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court takes only about eighty appeals each year.  Mark Moller, 
Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 667 n.154 (2011). 
 17.  A Father’s Fight, supra note 1. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). 
 21.  O’Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1303 (1995). 
 22.  See Juliet A. Cox, Judicial Wandering Through a Legislative Maze: Application of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to Child 
Custody Determinations, 58 MO. L. REV. 427, 427–28 (1993). 
 23.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (2006). 
 24.  See infra notes 213–29 and accompanying text. 
 25.  See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 181–82 (1988).  Forum shopping occurs when a 
party decides to file a lawsuit in one court rather than another because that court has a higher 
probability of a favorable outcome, based on the law of that forum.  See Christopher A. Whytock, 
The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 485–86 (2011). 
 26.  See Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 845, 854 (1992) (“With each interstate move, a new state becomes interested in the child’s 
welfare or in the parent’s custodial rights, yet the interests of states already concerned with the 
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interpretation of the law in J.M.W. v. T.I.Z.,27 allowing jurisdiction under the 
PKPA to be waived entirely if it is not raised in the lower court, defeats the 
purpose and language of the PKPA’s jurisdictional provisions.28  In today’s 
era and age—where 40.6% of births are to unwed couples29—the assumption 
that unwed fathers are unfit parents is no longer valid.  A solution is needed 
to ensure that unwed fathers who are willing and able to care for their 
children have adequate opportunities to assert their rights.30  This may entail 
clarifying the PKPA in its application to the adoption context and with 
regard to subject matter jurisdiction.31  Furthermore, a Supreme Court 
decision regarding interpretation of the PKPA or allowing a limited federal 
forum to resolve conflicting state custody decrees could reduce ambiguity 
and interstate conflict.32  Other solutions include passing alternative 
legislation applicable to adoptions or enacting putative father registries to 
ensure unwed fathers receive notice of proposed adoptions and have the 
opportunity to contest them.33  Any solution must balance the rights of the 
birth father with the rights of the mother and the best interest of the child.34  
Of these solutions, Supreme Court review of state interpretations of the 
PKPA has the most potential to prevent interstate custody disputes from 
occurring.35 
The first section of this Comment examines the background and history 
of legislation leading to the PKPA and other relevant laws.36  It also looks at 
the historic treatment of the rights of unwed fathers.37  The second part of 
this Comment looks at how the PKPA’s various provisions have been 
interpreted and applied, particularly in the adoption context.38  It addresses 
the ways in which adoptions are distinguishable from custody proceedings, 
perhaps warranting a separate law to regulate them.39  However, courts have 
 
dispute, the child, or the litigants, do no necessarily diminish.”). 
 27.  J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702 (Utah 2011). 
 28.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g). 
 29.  Births: Final Data for 2008, 59 CDC NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_01.pdf.  This contrasts with fifty years ago when 
about five percent of children were born to unwed parents.  See Jeffrey A. Parness & Therese A. 
Clarke Arado, Safe Haven, Adoption and Birth Record Laws: Where Are the Daddies?, 36 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 207, 230 (2007). 
 30.  See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (unwed fathers cannot be discriminated 
against when “they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child”). 
 31.  See infra notes 391–407 and accompanying text. 
 32.  See infra notes 345–59 and accompanying text. 
 33.  See infra notes 360–90 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See infra notes 309–40 and accompanying text. 
 35.  See infra notes 408–13 and accompanying text. 
 36.  See infra notes 45–130 and accompanying text. 
 37.  See infra notes 131–78 and accompanying text. 
 38.  See infra notes 179–229 and accompanying text. 
 39.  See infra notes 186–203 and accompanying text. 
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ultimately held that the PKPA applies to adoptions, and many of the 
rationales behind the PKPA are served by its application to adoptions.40  The 
third part of this Comment looks at the PKPA’s provision on jurisdiction as 
applied to recent cases,41 particularly J.M.W.42  The fourth part of this 
Comment examines the impact of uncertainty on unwed fathers and other 
involved parties.43  Finally, the fifth part of this Comment proposes potential 
solutions to prevent courts from following the dangerous precedent of 
J.M.W.44 
II.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A.  Prior to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act 
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has reserved matters of 
family law for the states.45  It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that 
courts began to consider cases of child custody, because it was the 
legislatures that granted divorces, and even those instances were few.46  
Once courts began to take child custody cases, they were generally reluctant 
to modify custody agreements on the premise that stability is usually in the 
best interest of the child and, accordingly, would usually only make 
modifications if the child was endangered in his or her current 
environment.47  However, many state courts failed to grant similar respect to 
 
 40.  See infra notes 186–203 and accompanying text. 
 41.  See infra notes 230–308 and accompanying text. 
 42.  J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702 (Utah 2011). 
 43.  See infra notes 309–40 and accompanying text. 
 44.  See infra notes 341–416 and accompanying text. 
 45.  See Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and 
Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711, 718 (1982).  The Supreme Court itself has stated: “The whole 
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the 
states, and not to the laws of the United States.”  Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).  
Therefore, in the case of child custody disputes, a federal forum was not available.  See Lance 
Christopher Kassab, Child Custody Disputes Litigated on the Jurisdictional Battlefield: Adoptive 
Parents vs. the Putative Father, Deboer v. Schmidt, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 401, 415–16 (1994). 
 46.  See Coombs, supra note 45, at 717. 
 47.  See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: 
Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 495, 499 (1975) [hereinafter The 
Rights of Children]; see also Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: 
A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1209 
(1969) [hereinafter Legislative Remedy] (noting the importance of a stable environment and routine 
for a growing child). 
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original custody determinations in other states.48  In a 1947 case, the 
Supreme Court upheld New York’s modification of a Florida custody decree 
and commented that custody decrees are “not irrevocable and 
unchangeable.”49  However, the Court explicitly declined to rule on the full 
faith and credit that must be accorded to the prior state’s rules for modifying 
custody agreements.50  This lack of guidance resulted in each state acting 
independently, without being held in check by the full faith and credit clause 
or any clear rules of jurisdiction to modify out-of-state custody awards.51  
Under common law, states took a more flexible jurisdictional approach to 
child custody.52  With any child custody case, there is always a tension 
between certainty and flexibility.53  Not surprisingly, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the number of interstate custody disputes increased enormously.54 
B.  The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
In light of the silence and lack of guidance by the Supreme Court, a 
Commissioner’s Special Committee on the Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
was formed in the 1970s in attempt to write uniform legislation to resolve 
issues in interstate custody law.55  The result was the Uniform Child Custody 
 
 48.  See The Rights of Children, supra note 47, at 500; Kassab, supra note 45, at 415.  That is not 
to say state courts were without reason in declining to enforce the custody awards of other states.  
See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 868.  There are several reasons that may warrant a new court 
assuming jurisdiction: (1) the court making the award lacked jurisdiction, (2) a change of 
circumstances makes intervention appropriate, or (3) the duty to look to the welfare and needs of the 
child requires that a court assume jurisdiction.  Id. 
 49.  New York v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 612, 615 (1947).  The Court also commented that a 
forum state has as much power to modify a judgment as the state where it was rendered does, based 
on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  Halvey, 330 U.S. at 614–15. 
 50.  Halvey, 330 U.S. at 615. 
 51.  See Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1211; see, e.g., Minick v. Minick, 149 So. 483, 
491 (Fla. 1933) (holding that custody decrees are “necessarily provisional and temporary in 
character” and the original court’s holding is merely “worthy of consideration”); Omer v. Omer, 193 
P. 1064, 1065 (Kan. 1920) (holding the Kansas court could proceed in a divorce case 
notwithstanding proceedings already filed in Oklahoma). 
 52.  See Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 
369, 378 (1991).  The effect of this was that “the law as it stood before the adoption of the UCCJA 
and the PKPA fairly invited kidnapping,” because a parent could easily take the child to another 
state to gain a more favorable forum.  Id.  Under the First Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, the 
child’s domicile was used to determine which state had initial jurisdiction, but courts generally did 
not constrain themselves with that rule.  See Sheldon A. Vincenti, The Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act: Time to Reassess, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 361 (1997). 
 53.  See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 856. 
 54.  See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction 
Act and Remaining Problems: Putative Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modification, 65 
CALIF. L. REV. 978, 979 (1977) [hereinafter Progress Under the UCCJA]. 
 55.  Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1217.  There were also hopes that the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) might have a positive effect on custody determinations in 
general, by emphasizing informed and carefully considered decisions.  Id. at 1219. 
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Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),56 which intended to create a method for handling 
jurisdictional disputes in custody cases in a uniform manner.57  A “‘custody 
proceeding’ includes proceedings in which a custody determination is one of 
several issues, such as an action for divorce, separation, or child neglect and 
dependency proceedings.”58 
Under the UCCJA’s basic provisions, full responsibility for the custody 
determinations of a child is given to a single court.59  Jurisdiction is dictated 
by section three and gives preference to the child’s home state or a state with 
which the child has a significant connection.60  The purpose of the six month 
period for the home-state provision is to establish a genuine residence, 
preventing relocation for forum shopping.61  As a complement to home-state 
jurisdiction, significant connection basis for jurisdiction recognizes that 
there may be several states with legitimate interests in the child’s welfare 
and resolution of the dispute.62  However, the two alternative bases for 
jurisdiction create the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction in situations 
where there is both a home state and a state with equal or stronger 
 
 56.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1968). 
 57.  See Barndt v. Barndt, 580 A.2d 320, 324 (Pa. 1990).  Some other stated purposes of the act 
include avoiding jurisdictional competition, promoting cooperation among the states, and reducing 
controversies to promote a stable home environment.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 1. 
 58.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 2(3).  Furthermore, a custody determination is defined 
as “a court decision and court orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including 
visitation rights.”  Id. § 2(2). 
 59.  See Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1218. 
 60.  See id. at 1218.  “Home state” is defined as: 
[T]he state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his 
parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecutive months, and in 
the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in which the child lived from birth 
with any of the persons mentioned. 
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 2(5).  Significant connection jurisdiction is a factor when: 
[I]t is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume jurisdiction because 
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant 
connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence 
concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships. 
Id. § 3(a)(2). 
 61.  See Andrea S. Charlow, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering and the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act, 25 FAM. L.Q. 299, 304 (1991).  However, it may work counter to that purpose by 
encouraging parents to keep the child hidden to meet the six-month requirement.  Id. at 305. 
 62.  See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 870.  Furthermore, having only a home state provision is not 
adequate to cover the wide array of factual situations that may arise in custody disputes, particularly 
if the child has not lived in one place long enough for it to qualify as a home state.  See Legislative 
Remedy, supra note 47, at 1225. 
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connections.63  Ideally, jurisdiction would vest with one state at a time and if 
concurrent jurisdiction existed, only one state would exercise it.64  The 
UCCJA also contains methods to assist courts in communicating and sharing 
information.65  Jurisdiction to modify a custody decree stays with the 
original court until a sister state meets the jurisdictional requirements, 
resulting in either concurrent jurisdiction or jurisdiction in the new state 
alone.66  Finally, in an effort to deter child-snatching, the UCCJA adopts the 
“clean hands” doctrine and allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction 
if a child is taken wrongfully from another state.67 
 
 63.  See Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1226. 
 64.  See Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparative Ruminations From the Bayou on Child Custody 
Jurisdiction: the UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, 58 LA. L. REV. 
449, 465–66 (1998) [hereinafter Comparative Ruminations].  It would be preferable for jurisdiction 
to lie with the court that has the best access to information about the child and family.  See 
Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1218.  The text of the UCCJA provides: 
A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if at the time of filing 
the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of 
another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act, unless the 
proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this State is a more 
appropriate forum or for other reasons. 
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 6(a).  There are three devices in the UCCJA designed to 
prevent conflicting custody decrees in the event of concurrent jurisdiction: (1) obligation of the 
parties to tell the court of any pending proceedings in other states, (2) communication among the 
courts to proceed only in the more appropriate forum, and (3) priority-of-filing rule.  See Brigitte M. 
Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the 
UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 210, 210–11 (1981) [hereinafter Interstate Custody]. 
 65.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 6(b)–(c).  However, some courts have interpreted this 
to mean only that a court must inquire if it may assert jurisdiction under the UCCJA, not whether the 
state is best suited to decide custody.  See Linda M. Demelis, Interstate Child Custody and the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: The Continuing Search for a National Standard, 45 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1329, 1335 (1994).  To some degree, these provisions may be idealistic, because many judges 
tend to answer only to the appellate courts and desire to take matters into their own hands.  See 
Henry H. Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 297, 323 
(1981).  The result of this is essentially to sabotage the system created under the UCCJA and to 
encourage parents who may “seize and run.”  Id. at 325. 
 66.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 13.  Modification of custody decrees is beyond the 
scope of this article—as it is inapplicable in the adoption context—but is another issue that has been 
subject to much dispute and conflicting views.  See generally The Rights of Children, supra note 47.  
Furthermore, courts have often confused initial and continuing jurisdiction, which has reduced the 
effectiveness of the UCCJA.  See Interstate Custody, supra note 64, at 216. 
 67.  See Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1219.  The UCCJA states, “If the petitioner for an 
initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar 
reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if this is just and proper under 
the circumstances.”  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 8(a).  This provision helps to close some 
of the loopholes in the UCCJA, preventing parents from manipulating its provisions in their favor.  
See Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1242.  However, in order for this provision to be effective, 
a certain degree of judicial restraint is required to determine if changed circumstances exist for the 
court to have jurisdiction.  See Rita Mankovich Irani, Parental Kidnapping: Can the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act and Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 Effectively Deter 
It?, 20 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 60 (1981). 
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The success of the UCCJA was limited, due both to variations adopted 
by each state and to differences in interpretation by the courts.68  Further, 
because each state’s version may differ and the requirements are self-
imposed, a state could use its own law—not the version of the UCCJA 
enacted by the rendering state—to determine if recognition is required.69  As 
one example of differing versions adopted, Alaska’s original version of the 
UCCJA had no provision for significant connection jurisdiction.70  State 
versions of the UCCJA have mostly been repealed by state adoption of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).71  The 
jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA also allow states to interpret the Act 
to obtain concurrent jurisdiction.72  Some scholars have said with regard to 
the enforcement provisions of the UCCJA “that some states interpret even 
this requirement so that uniformity is an exaggeration and comity is 
undependable.”73  Furthermore, courts often failed to give full faith and 
credit to proceedings in other states, prompting the need for national 
legislation.74  Additionally, in the event of child-snatching, the UCCJA had 
 
 68.  See Barndt v. Barndt, 580 A.2d 320, 324 (Pa. 1990).  “Both of these phenomena operate to 
allow for more findings of jurisdiction and less deference to initial states’ orders than the drafters 
envisaged.”  Joan M. Krauskopf, Remedies for Parental Kidnapping in Federal Court: A Comment 
Applying the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act in Support of Judge Edwards, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 
429, 434 (1984); see also Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 54, at 1003–14 (noting the 
obstacles to interstate solutions, particularly with regard to punitive custody modifications, joint 
custody, and excessive custody modification); Coombs, supra note 45, at 724 (arguing some states 
will consider jurisdiction under the UCCJA when there are no foreign proceedings pending, but are 
more reluctant to find they lack jurisdiction or should defer to the jurisdiction of another state); 
David H. Levy & Nanette A. McCarthy, A Critique of the Proposed Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 149, 149 (1998) (“Unfortunately, 
different interpretations of the Act have resulted in a hodgepodge of state interpretation of the 
UCCJA which has created confusion, often worse than before the UCCJA was enacted.”). 
 69.  See Vincenti, supra note 52, at 368.  In addition, “The UCCJA’s dependence on judicial 
interpretation may place too much discretion in the hands of state judges whose treatment of the 
statute may differ.”  Gaines H. Cleveland, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Dual Responses to Interstate Child Custody Problems, 39 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 157 (1982). 
 70.  ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.020 (1983), repealed by 1998 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 133, § 4.  For a 
general discussion of the differing provisions of state’s UCCJAs, see Christopher L. Blakesley, 
Child Custody—Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291, 316–25 (1986) [hereinafter 
Jurisdiction and Procedure].  For examples of state versions of the UCCJA, see KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 403.400–403.630 (West 1980), repealed by 2004 Ky. Acts ch. 133; 23 PA. CONS. STATS. 
ANN. §§ 5341–5366 (1980), repealed by 2004 Pa. Laws 236, No. 39, § 2; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 
11.01–11.75 (West 1975), repealed by 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 20, § 2. 
 71.  See infra notes 102–07 and accompanying text. 
 72.  See Kassab, supra note 45, at 416. 
 73.  See Coombs, supra note 45, at 716. 
 74.  See Melissa Crawford, In the Best Interests of the Child? The Misapplication of the UCCJA 
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no provisions to assist in finding the abducting parent.75  Ultimately, most 
scholars agree that “the UCCJA has not provided a consistently reliable 
solution to the problem of the interstate child,”76 leading the need for reform. 
C.  The PKPA 
In 1980, the PKPA77 was enacted as a federal attempt to supplement the 
UCCJA and create uniform interpretation and implementation in cases 
involving interstate custody disputes.78  When the PKPA was enacted, only 
about fifty percent of the states had adopted some version of the UCCJA.79  
One of the PKPA’s main goals was to prevent sister states from issuing 
competing custody decrees.80  In addition, the PKPA reduces the incentive to 
“child snatch”—a kind of “forum shopping” wherein one parent without 
custody takes the child to another state to re-litigate custody.81  It requires 
states to give full faith and credit to child custody determinations from other 
states.82  However, full faith and credit does not mean that the determination 
from the initial state is final, but merely that it must be given the same 
 
and the PKPA to Interstate Adoption Custody Disputes, 19 VT. L. REV. 99, 105–06 (1994). 
 75.  See Krauskopf, supra note 68, at 435. 
 76.  Goldstein, supra note 26, at 848. 
 77.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006). 
 78.  See Barndt v. Barndt, 580 A.2d 320, 331 (Pa. 1990).  Not all scholars agreed on the need for 
the PKPA; some argued that the UCCJA was working effectively and that “[t]he PKPA needlessly 
disturbs this cooperative system by mandating the exclusive continuing jurisdiction of the original 
home state.”  Foster, supra note 65, at 342.  Part of the issue is that the PKPA was enacted shortly 
after many states had enacted the UCCJA, giving them little time to interpret the UCCJA before 
having to deal with a new set of rules under the PKPA.  Id. at 300. 
 79.  See Comparative Ruminations, supra note 64, at 468. 
 80.  See In re Marriage of Fontenot, 232 P.3d 358, 360–61 (Mont. 2010). 
 81.  See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 181–82 (1988); see also Progress Under the 
UCCJA, supra note 54, at 979 (citing in a 1977 article an estimation that 100,000 children are 
abducted or detained by parents or their agents each year). 
 82.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A.  This is based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, 
which states that “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 1.  In general terms, Congress has codified this clause by statute.  28 U.S.C. § 
1738.  The Supreme Court has upheld the application of the clause to almost all areas of law.  See 
Cleveland, supra note 69, at 149.  Practically speaking, this means that a state cannot refuse to grant 
full faith and credit to another state’s decision merely because of a disagreement with public policy.  
See Joan H. Hollinger, The Mobile Family: Interstate Jurisdictional Puzzles and Full Faith and 
Credit for Adoption and Other Parentage Orders, 225 PLI/CRIM 85, 116 (2010) [hereinafter The 
Mobile Family].  This has recently become a greater issue with regard to the recognition of 
adoptions by same-sex couples.  Id. at 120; see generally Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition 
of Parentage in a Time of Disharmony: Same-Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 
563 (2009) (discussing the recognition of prior custody proceedings in other states in the context of 
lesbian and gay parenting). 
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respect that would be given to a determination made in the same state.83  The 
PKPA adopts the same basic provisions as the UCCJA and includes the 
same definitions for custody determination, home state, and significant 
connection.84  However, unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA gives clear priority to 
the home state over any other state that may have significant connections.85  
In addition, the PKPA explicitly gives continuing jurisdiction to the original 
court, as long as either (1) the laws of the state provide for jurisdiction or (2) 
the child or one of the parties resides in the state.86  In comparing the PKPA 
and the UCCJA, the PKPA tends to favor certainty and stability, while the 
UCCJA is more flexible and focuses on the best interests of the child.87  If 
the two statutes conflict with regard to jurisdiction, the PKPA prevails under 
the Supremacy Clause.88  With regard to jurisdiction specifically, the PKPA 
 
 83.  See Greg Waller, When the Rules Don’t Fit the Game: Application of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Preventing Act to Interstate Adoption 
Proceedings, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 271, 275 (1996).  Because custody orders are generally 
modifiable if circumstances have changed, full faith and credit does not mean that a state cannot 
modify a custody order of an earlier state.  Id. 
 84.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3) (custody determination); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (home state); 28 
U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (significant connection).  For comparable UCCJA provisions, see supra 
notes 58 and 60. 
 85.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)–(B); see Comparative Ruminations, supra note 64, at 475.  
Other notable differences include more detailed court and notice instructions in the UCCJA and 
specific criteria in the UCCJA for declining jurisdiction for forum non coveniens and party 
misconduct.  See Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 325–31.  Although giving preference 
to the home state may provide clarity in interpretation, it is also questionable if a “strict domicile 
basis for jurisdiction” is the best rule.  Id. at 295 (internal citations omitted).  The welfare of children 
may call for greater flexibility in granting jurisdiction.  Id. 
 86.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d), (f).  This is designed to make modification more difficult under the 
PKPA, because the state retains jurisdiction in a greater number of circumstances.  See Waller, supra 
note 83, at 283.  Although this is distinguishable from the provisions under the UCCJA, there is a 
split in authority as to the importance of continuing jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Jurisdiction and 
Procedure, supra note 70, at 313. 
 87.  See Foster, supra note 65, at 303 (noting that by minimizing significant connection 
jurisdiction, the PKPA attacks uncertainty and instability). 
 88.  See Atkins v. Atkins, 823 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1992) (holding that although under the 
UCCJA there may have been concurrent jurisdiction, the home state has exclusive jurisdiction under 
the PKPA); D.B. v. P.B., 692 So. 2d 856, 860 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (“In areas of conflict between 
the two statutes on matters of jurisdiction, the PKPA prevails.”) (citing Blankenship v. Blankenship, 
534 So. 2d 320, 321 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)).  But see Templeton v. Witham, 595 F. Supp. 770, 772 
(S.D. Cal. 1984) (holding PKPA is not a clear case of federal preemption because it expressly 
incorporates state law); Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 331 (Congress showed no 
intent for the PKPA to preempt state UCCJAs, and the fact that the PKPA leaves out subjects 
covered in the UCCJA indicates preemption was not intended); Demelis, supra note 65, at 1340 
(“[T]echnically the PKPA cannot preempt the UCCJA because the UCCJA covers many areas that 
the PKPA does not address.”). 
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provides that a state should not exercise jurisdiction when another state is 
currently exercising jurisdiction.89  This section states: 
 A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any 
proceeding for a custody or visitation determination commenced 
during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State 
where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction 
consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody or 
visitation determination.90 
“The purpose of this last provision is to avoid the ‘havoc wreaked by 
simultaneous and competitive jurisdiction.’”91 
Although the PKPA created uniform law across the states, it did not 
necessarily create uniform interpretation and application.92  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court explicitly denied a federal cause of action under the PKPA to 
determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid.93  The 
ideal is that the judges of the two states communicate and discuss the matter 
to agree on the better forum to act in the best interest of the child, avoiding 
jurisdictional competition.94  Regrettably, this has not been the case, and 
many courts have ignored proceedings in another state, exercising their own 
jurisdiction.95  In addition, courts interpret the law in creative ways to allow 
 
 89.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Murphy v. Danforth, 915 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Ark. 1996) (quoting Kimmons v. Heldt, 667 
P.2d 1245, 1249 (Alaska 1983)). 
 92.  See Cox, supra note 22, at 427–28.  As Cox states: 
The UCCJA and PKPA establish a maze of procedural hurdles over which a court must 
jump to determine the proper forum in which to consider child custody issues.  The Acts 
are complex and interrelated.  For this reason, many courts . . . have misapplied them and 
therefore have failed to accommodate the policy considerations that initially gave rise to 
the Acts. 
Id.  See also Levy & McCarthy, supra note 68, at 149 (“[T]he expansion of federal legislation into 
the area of family law, and particularly the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (‘PKPA’), increased 
the confusion and conflict not only between the states, but between the federal statute and various 
state statutes.”). 
 93.  Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (stating that the “context, language, and 
history of the PKPA” work against inferring a federal cause of action); see also Demelis, supra note 
65, at 1355–56. 
 94.  See Bowden v. Bowden, 440 A.2d 1160, 1164–65 (N.J. 1982) (noting how this promotes 
cooperation, one of the key purposes of the UCCJA). 
 95.  See Norsworthy v. Norsworthy, 713 S.W.2d 451, 486 (Ark. 1986).  In terms of the goals of 
the legislation: 
Those purposes are not served when a court, with knowledge that the subject matter of 
child custody is pending in another state, totally ignores the foreign proceeding and 
exercises jurisdiction over a child, who has been in the state for less than a month, for the 
purpose of making a permanent custody award. 
Id. at 486 (internal citations omitted).  Two newsworthy instances of this were the “Baby Richard” 
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them to avoid the effects of the PKPA’s jurisdictional provisions.96  
Furthermore, in spite of Congress’s best efforts, there may still be cases in 
which there are concurrent exercises of jurisdiction.97  As a result of these 
failures, forum shopping by parents and snatching of children has not been 
eliminated—one of the main intentions of the PKPA.98  Additionally, the 
PKPA has no provision for sanctions if its terms are violated, nor any 
guidance as to exactly how decrees from other states are to be enforced.99  
While the PKPA has provided some clarity in issues of interstate child 
custody disputes, there have been numerous calls for reformation or new 
legislation.100 
D.  Other Relevant Legislation 
In 1997, another attempt was made at uniform legislation with the 
UCCJEA,101 adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws.102  Its purpose was to resolve any ambiguity in the 
 
case, O’Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1138 (1995), and the “Baby Jessica” case, In re Clausen, 502 
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993), both highly publicized cases involving interstate adoption and 
jurisdiction disputes between two states.  See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.  For an 
extensive discussion of the Baby Jessica case, see Marian L. Faupel, The “Baby Jessica Case” and 
the Claimed Conflict Between Children’s and Parent’s Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 285 (1994); 
Kassab, supra note 45. 
 96.  See Waller, supra note 83, at 283. 
 97.  See Kassab, supra note 45, at 418.  In particular, if the original state is not acting in 
conformity with the PKPA, a second state may exercise jurisdiction.  Id.  The text of the PKPA 
reads, “where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions 
of this section to make a custody or visitation determination.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (2006).  In 
terms of modification, the PKPA states, “The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce 
according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this 
section, any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions 
of this section by a court of another State.”  Id. § 1738A(a).  Provisions also exist for emergency 
situations.  Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(C).  Emergency jurisdiction has created one possible loophole under 
the PKPA, because the second state determines if an emergency exists and can obtain jurisdiction 
unless the judgment is clearly erroneous.  See Foster, supra note 65, at 340. 
 98.  See Charlow, supra note 61, at 300–01. 
 99.  See Foster, supra note 65, at 335; see also Krauskopf, supra note 68, at 437 (“The PKPA 
does not create or specify enforcement remedies.”).  Essentially, by omitting the “clean hands” 
provision of UCCJA section 8, the PKPA leaves it to the states to decide how strong of a policy they 
will adopt to deter parental kidnapping.  See Irani, supra note 67, at 60. 
 100.  See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 26, at 850–51 (arguing the PKPA “has not solved the 
problem of the interstate child any more than the UCCJA did”); Vincenti, supra note 52, at 352. 
 101.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. & ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1997). 
 102.  See Levy & McCarthy, supra note 68, at 150. 
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UCCJA and to resolve conflicts between the UCCJA and the PKPA.103  If 
enacted, the UCCJEA replaces a state’s UCCJA.104  The UCCJEA adopts the 
provisions of the PKPA and gives jurisdictional priority to the child’s home 
state.105  In terms of interstate cooperation, the UCCJEA alters the UCCJA in 
an attempt to decrease interstate judicial competition by making it clear that 
courts should use modern communications technology to aid in the 
resolution of interstate battles.106  While the UCCJEA may provide further 
clarity in typical child custody cases, it specifically excludes adoptions and 
defers to the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA).107 
The UAA108 was first proposed in 1994 and has yet to be adopted by all 
states.109  Its goals in the adoption context are analogous to the goals of the 
UCCJEA for divorce and other custody proceedings.110  Namely, the UAA 
 
 103.  See Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, UCCJEA: A New Approach to Custody Jurisdiction and 
Interstate Custody and Visitation, 92 ILL. B.J. 204, 206 (2004).  Like the UCCJA, the main goal of 
the UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between state courts in child custody 
cases.  See Hindle v. Fuithu, 33 So. 3d 782, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).  Like the PKPA, the 
UCCJEA specifically states that full faith and credit must be given to orders of other states, unlike 
the UCCJA.  See Gamrath, supra, at 208. 
 104.  See Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC’s of the UCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody Practice Under 
the New Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267, 268 (1998); see also The Mobile Family, supra note 82, at 89 (as of 
2010, the UCCJEA supersedes the UCCJA in all but one or two states).  For examples of state 
UCCJEA laws, see, for example, ALA. CODE §§ 30-3B-101 to 30-3B-404 (2011); CAL. FAM. CODE 
§§ 3400–3465 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.501–61.542 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 
19-9-40 to 19-9-104 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1336 to 38-1377 (West 2011); NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 43-1226 to 43-1266 (2011); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 551-101 to 551-402 (West 2011). 
 105.  See Levy & McCarthy, supra note 68, at 150–51.  The UCCJEA eliminates use of the best 
interest of the child standard, which created confusion under the UCCJA, as a way to obtain 
jurisdiction.  See Gamrath, supra note 103, at 207.  However, the home state jurisdiction provision 
under the UCCJEA has still been subject to varying interpretations.  See generally Ann K. Wooster, 
Annotation, Construction and Application of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act’s Home State Jurisdiction Provision, 57 A.L.R. 6TH 163 (2010).  The similarity 
between the PKPA and UCCJEA leads to the conclusion that courts’ interpretations under the 
UCCJEA may dictate interpretations under the PKPA in the adoption context. 
 106.  See Hoff, supra note 104, at 287.  It also combines and clarifies several provisions of the 
UCCJA that courts previously ignored, further reducing competition.  Id. 
 107.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 103, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1997). 
 108.  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 45 (1994). 
 109.  See The Mobile Family, supra note 82, at 88–89.  For state adoptions of the UAA, see, for 
example, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-201 to 9-9-224 (West 2011); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1– 
50/24 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-134 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-15-01 to 
14-15-23 (West 2011).  Some states have explicitly declined to adopt the UAA as a whole.  See, e.g., 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7501-1.1 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1200 to 63.2-1220.1 
(West 2011).  For a further discussion of the differences between the Virginia Adoption Code and 
the UAA, see generally Erin Green, Unwed Fathers’ Rights in Adoption: The Virginia Code vs. the 
Uniform Adoption Act, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 267 (2005). 
 110.  See The Mobile Family, supra note 82, at 92.  Under the UAA, the emphasis is on having 
cases heard in the forum that has the closest connections to a proposed adoptive family, as well as 
the most substantial evidence regarding that family.  Id.  The need for separate adoption legislation 
may be warranted by the increased rate of adoptions, as well as the current pro-adoption stance of 
the federal government.  See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 
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seeks to eliminate the confusion caused by different state laws and to create 
adoption laws that promote certainty, predictability, and stability.111  
However, the lack of widespread enactment of the UAA, along with the 
exclusion of adoptions from the UCCJEA, has created a void in 
jurisdictional rules applicable to interstate adoptions.112  The UAA requires 
consent of both parents for adoption of a minor child if the parent has 
manifested parenting behavior in assuming some parental duties.113  By 
contrast, men who have performed no parental duties waive the right to veto 
an adoption.114  If a father is vested with consent rights under the UAA, then 
he must be served with notice of an adoption proceeding.115  In terms of 
jurisdiction, the UAA mirrors the UCCJA, but allows a child to be living 
with “a prospective adoptive parent” to meet the requirement under the 
home state provision.116  In addition, the UAA makes it clear that adoption 
decrees are final.117  In terms of international adoption and custody disputes, 
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) applies.118 
Finally, the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) is 
another example of uniform legislation written in attempt to facilitate 
interstate adoption.119  The ICPC has been enacted into law in almost all 
 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1034–36 (2002) [hereinafter Toward a Database]. 
 111.  See Mishannock Robbins Arzt, In the Best Interests of the Child: The Uniform Adoption Act, 
25 STETSON L. REV. 835, 842 (1996). 
 112.  See Hoff, supra note 104, at 276–77. 
 113.  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401(a)(1)(iii)(A). 
 114.  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-402(a)(2).  The language of the UAA provides a clearer standard, 
considering only whether the father has made support payments or communicated with the child.  
See Arzt, supra note 111, at 868.  This contrasts with other state standards that consider whether 
there is “evidence of willful rejection of . . . parental obligations.”  G.T. v. Adoption of A.E.T., 725 
So. 2d 404, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (applying FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.032 (West 2011)). 
 115.  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-401(a); see also Scott A. Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: 
Defining the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Newborn Adoptions, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 363, 413–14 
(1996).  The burden on providing notice falls on the natural mother, prospective adoptive parents, 
and the court itself.  See Arzt, supra note 111, at 874. 
 116.  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-101.  This alteration gives clarity to the home state for adoption of 
infants, resolving many issues under the UCCJA.  See Herma Kill Kay, Adoption in the Conflict of 
Laws: The UAA, Not the UCCJA, is the Answer, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 703, 744–45 (1996). 
 117.  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-706.  The UAA also prevents a decree from being challenged after 
six months have passed.  Id. § 3-707. 
 118.  INT’L CHILD ABDUCTION REMEDIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2006).  This was 
implemented at the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in 
1988.  This Comment focuses on interstate adoptions, not international adoptions, but for a general 
discussion of ICARA and the application of the UCCJA in the international arena, see Comparative 
Ruminations, supra note 64, at 524–38. 
 119.  INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (1960); Bernadette W. Hartfield, 
The Role of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. 
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states.120  In terms of jurisdiction, the ICPC retains jurisdiction by the 
sending adoption agency if a child is placed in another state.121  The ICPC’s 
main functions are mostly procedural, dictating how states should coordinate 
with each other during interstate adoptions.122  Therefore, a court is not 
required to comply with the ICPC in order to exercise jurisdiction.123  In 
addition, the ICPC has been subject to the same deficiencies as other 
legislative attempts, namely varying degrees of interpretation and 
noncompliance, as well as lack of awareness.124  Furthermore, its main 
purpose was “to prevent States from unilaterally ‘dumping’ their foster care 
responsibilities on other jurisdictions.”125  Therefore, it is less applicable in 
the adoption context, because in the new state the child’s welfare is taken 
care of by the adoptive parents.126 
The focus of this Comment is on domestic interstate adoption and will 
therefore emphasize the PKPA.127  Model legislation, such as the UAA, 
provides some guidance in courts’ interpretation and application, but varies 
too much from state to state in enactment and language to establish uniform 
precedent.128  Furthermore, the PKPA is the relevant legislation addressed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in J.M.W.129  However, due to the similarity in their 
language, older cases often address the PKPA and UCCJA simultaneously, 
and these acts may be used interchangeably in some circumstances.130 
E.  Unwed Fathers’ Rights 
While these various forms of uniform legislation have defined the rights 
of unwed fathers to a certain extent, Supreme Court precedent and state 
legislation also provide a basis for rights.  Historically, a man’s ability to 
 
REV. 292, 293 (1989). 
 120.  See Hartfield, supra note 119, at 293; see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7900–7912 (West 
2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 381 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2A-1 to 49-2A-2 
(West 2011). 
 121.  INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN art. V(a). 
 122.  See J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732, 740 (Ariz. 1995). 
 123.  See id.  The UCCJA (and PKPA) are specifically designed to deal with jurisdiction, and 
therefore the ICPC should not negate those provisions.  Id. at 745.  See also Adoption of Zachariah 
K., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 431 (Ct. App. 1992) (“[T]he ICPC could not take precedence over any 
conflicting provisions in the PKPA.”); In re D.N., 858 So. 2d 1087, 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) 
(UCCJA and PKPA control, not the ICPC). 
 124.  See Hartfield, supra note 119, at 293. 
 125.  In re Shaida W., 649 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (N.Y. 1995). 
 126.  See In re Jarrett, 660 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (App. Div. 1997). 
 127.  The UCCJEA is inapplicable to adoptions, see supra note 107 and accompanying text, and 
international adoptions are not at issue in this Comment.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 129.  J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702, 704 (Utah 2011). 
 130.  See, e.g., Doe v. Baby Girl, 657 S.E.2d 455, 462 (S.C. 2008). 
06 MILLER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:20 PM 
[Vol. 40: 735, 2013] Where Can the Unwed Father Turn? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
751 
raise children was seen as inferior to a woman’s ability.131  Under this 
theory, the consent of an unwed father was not required for an adoption.132  
By statute, many states restricted the rights of unwed fathers to prevent them 
from contesting an adoption if the birth mother desired to place the child for 
adoption.133  However, new technology in the form of DNA testing has 
helped lessen the stigma of children born out of wedlock.134  Furthermore, 
since 1972 the Supreme Court and state courts have begun to delineate the 
rights of unwed fathers and the scope of those rights.135 
1.  Supreme Court 
The first Supreme Court case to address this issue was Stanley v. 
Illinois.136  In that case, the Court held that a statutory presumption that an 
unwed father is unfit is unconstitutional.137  In doing so, the Court struck 
down an Illinois law that declared children of unmarried fathers to be 
dependents of the state, without a hearing or proof of neglect.138  The Court 
further stated that “[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have 
been deemed ‘essential.’”139  Six years later in Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court 
retracted the rights of unwed fathers when it held: (1) that due process only 
required the state to find that the adoption was consistent with the best 
interests of the child and (2) that equal protection rights are not violated if 
the unwed father has never assumed any responsibility for the child.140  In 
Quilloin, the Court upheld a Georgia law requiring only the birth mother’s 
 
 131.  See Kimberly Barton, Who’s Your Daddy?: State Adoption Statutes and the Unknown 
Biological Father, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 113, 115 (2003). 
 132.  See 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 58 (1938); Barton, supra note 131, at 116.  Generally 
speaking, “[t]he requirement of parental consent derives from the principle of parental autonomy, 
which, in turn, is a product of cultural traditions and theories of natural law and delegated duties that 
endow biological parents with superior rights to the possession and control of their offspring.”  Joan 
Heifetz Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 
37, 39 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004) [hereinafter State and Federal 
Adoption Laws]. 
 133.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 116.  Some states even defined the “parent” of an illegitimate 
child to be only the mother.  Id. 
 134.  See Sarah McGinnis, You Are Not the Father: How State Paternity Laws Protect (And Fail 
to Protect) the Best Interests of Children, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 311, 315 (2007). 
 135.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 117. 
 136.  405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 137.  Id. at 658. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 140.  Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1978). 
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consent for the adoption of an illegitimate child, and requiring the father to 
marry the mother or acknowledge the child as his own in order to obtain 
veto power over the adoption.141  Shortly after Quilloin, the Court in Caban 
v. Mohammed declared a New York statute giving a mother, but not a father, 
the right to consent to adoption unconstitutional.142  The Court held that a 
statute cannot constitutionally distinguish between unwed mothers and 
unwed fathers.143 
After seemingly progressing in recognizing the rights of unwed fathers 
with Caban, the Court took a step back in Lehr v. Robinson.144  Lehr held 
that an unwed father who had not established a relationship with his child 
was not constitutionally entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard 
prior to the child’s adoption.145  The Court rejected an unwed father’s due 
process and equal protection claims because he failed to enter his name on 
the putative father registry and did not meet any of the state’s classes of 
possible fathers who were required to be given notice of an adoption.146  
Finally, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court denied an unwed father’s 
opportunity to establish paternity on the grounds that a child is presumed to 
be the result of a married couple.147  The Court also distinguished an 
irrebuttable presumption from a conclusive presumption, finding the latter to 
be constitutional.148 
While these cases grant an unwed father some constitutional rights if he 
has developed a substantial relationship with the child, many questions are 
still unanswered, particularly in the context of adoption of newborns born 
out of wedlock.149  All these cases involved older children, leaving a void in 
precedent with regard to newborn children.150  Newborn children represent a 
unique situation, because, unlike with older children, unwed fathers are less 
likely to have had the chance to develop a relationship with the child.151  The 
 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 145.  Id. at 267–68. 
 146.  Id. at 250–51.  Essentially, the state required unwed fathers to meet a “biology plus” 
standard before recognizing their rights.  See Laura Oren, Unmarried Fathers and Adoption: 
“Perfecting” or “Abandoning” an Opportunity Interest, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 253, 254 (2007).  This 
means that if the father shows a commitment to parenthood, he has a right that receives protection, 
but “the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.”  
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. 
 147.  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989). 
 148.  Id. at 120. 
 149.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 126. 
 150.  See Tonya M. Zdon, Putative Fathers’ Rights: Striking the Right Balance in Adoption Laws, 
20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 929, 939 (1994). 
 151.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 114.  Furthermore, the identity of the biological father may 
not even be known.  Id.  Newborn child adoptions make up nearly half of all adoptions in the United 
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Court has not spoken on whether an unwed father has a right to veto the 
adoption of a child born out of wedlock if he has been denied the 
opportunity to develop a relationship.152  Furthermore, Supreme Court 
precedent appears to set up two portraits that unwed fathers may fit: (1) a 
father who is involved in the child’s life and (2) a father who ignored the 
child and waited to assert his rights.153  This leaves great uncertainty as to 
how a father who falls in the middle—or one who tried to assert his rights 
but was thwarted—should be treated.154  After Lehr and Michael H., unwed 
fathers’ best chance of having their rights acknowledged was in the state 
courts.155 
Outside of the unwed father context, the Supreme Court also has made 
several key rulings on the nature of the parent–child relationship.156  In 
Lassiter, the Court stated, “A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of 
the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore a 
commanding one.”157  A year later in Santosky, the Court went further to 
hold, “Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of 
parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State supports its 
allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”158  Finally, the Court 
has also held that a state cannot deny an indigent parent appellate review in a 
parental rights termination proceeding.159 
2.  State Courts 
Whether or not an unwed father is entitled to notice of a proposed 
adoption varies from state to state.160  Based on natural rights alone, if there 
 
States and are usually finalized while the child is still under the age of two.  See Zdon, supra note 
150, at 939. 
 152.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 127. 
 153.  See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless 
Father, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER, supra note 132, at 52. 
 154.  See Meyer, supra note 153, at 52; see, e.g., supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. 
 155.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 127. 
 156.  See Oren, supra note 146, at 281. 
 157.  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).  In that case, the 
court held that an indigent mother’s rights were not violated when the trial court failed to appoint her 
counsel, because she did not make an effort to contest the parental termination proceeding.  Id. at 33. 
 158.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).  In doing so, the Court struck down a 
New York statute allowing parental rights to be terminated by only a “fair preponderance of the 
evidence” finding.  Id. at 747. 
 159.  M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996). 
 160.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 127; Lisa M. Simpson, Adoption Law: It May Take a Village 
to Raise a Child, But it Takes National Uniformity to Adopt One, 3 PHX. L. REV. 575, 579–81 
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is no statute in place, a parent’s consent is required to sever his parental 
rights and establish them with adoptive parents.161  However, states have 
enacted statutes governing the rights of unwed fathers, with some states 
granting rights based on the father’s legal status and whether he has 
acknowledged paternity.162  Other states may require a specific period of 
time for an unwed father to file a notice of paternity.163  In terms of consent, 
states may go as far as having “absolute consent requirements,” or they may 
adopt lesser requirements of “conditional consent.”164  After an adoption has 
been finalized, an unwed father is limited in the amount of time in which he 
may challenge the adoption, also with variance among the states.165  To some 
extent, states may be subject to federal paternity law guidelines if they 
participate in federal welfare programs under the Social Security Act.166 
A growing trend among the states is a putative father registry, which 
allows unwed men who believe they may have fathered a child out of 
wedlock to file notice with the appropriate state agency.167  The main 
 
(2010).  From a due process standpoint, under the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, “Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may 
enjoy that right they must first be notified.”  Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).  
Regardless, “[S]tates have almost complete discretion to determine the rights of a putative father at 
proceedings to terminate parental rights or adoption proceedings.  Further, there is a lack of 
uniformity among states as to the level of protection available to unwed fathers.”  MARGARET C. 
JASPER, THE LAW OF ADOPTION 44 (2008). 
 161.  See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 548 (La. 1990). 
 162.  See, e.g., Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1056–57 (Ind. 1992) 
(putative father did not establish paternity previously as provided by statute and thus his consent was 
not required for adoption); In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 635 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Neb. 2001) 
(putative father who did not properly file petition for adjudication of paternity was not entitled to any 
further notice of adoption proceeding). 
 163.  Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01(B) (2011) (notice of a claim of paternity and 
father’s willingness and intent to support the child must be filed within thirty days of the child’s 
birth), and MINN. STAT. § 259.52(7) (2011) (notice must be filed no later than thirty days after the 
birth of the child), with NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (2011) (notice of objection to adoption and 
intent to obtain custody must be filed within five business days after the birth of the child). 
 164.  See Resnik, supra note 115, at 391–93. 
 165.  See id. at 399–400. 
 166.  See Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity Laws: Securing More Fathers at Birth for the 
Children of Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 60 (2006).  For instance, states accepting funds 
must “[e]stablish goals and take action to prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies, with special emphasis on teenage pregnancies, and establish numerical goals for 
reducing the illegitimacy ratio of the State.”  42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(v) (2006). 
 167.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1039.  This is in part due to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lehr, and by 2007 at least thirty-four states had codified such registries.  See Tyler M. 
Hawkins, Comment, Adoption of Infants Born to Unaware, Unwed Fathers: A Statutory Proposal 
That Better Balances the Interests Involved, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 1348; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 
26-10C-1 (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-18-701 to 20-
18-705 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 192.016 (West 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (West 
2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-110 (West 2011) (called a “notice of intent to retain parental 
rights”).  For a detailed structure of putative father registries, see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 
2002), 9A U.L.A. 579 (1979); see generally Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Requirements and 
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purpose of putative father registries is to protect unwed fathers by giving 
them notice of pending adoption proceedings.168  These registries also 
protect the birth mother’s privacy rights, because she is not required to 
identify the father or reveal her pregnancy.169  Generally, putative father 
registries require men either to assume responsibility in a timely manner or 
have their rights terminated.170  However, even regulations for putative father 
registries vary from state to state.171  For instance, some states require a 
putative father to register or else lose the right to notice of and objection to 
an adoption proceeding; other states require birth mothers to use due 
diligence in naming and notifying the putative father.172  As an alternative to 
a putative father registry, some states require notice by publication.173 
 
Effects of Putative Father Registries, 28 A.L.R. 6TH 349 (2007). 
 168.  See Mary Beck, Birthfather Registries, ADOPTIVE FAM. (2002), available at 
http://www.adoptivefamilies.com/articles.php?aid=233 [hereinafter Birthfather Registries]. 
 169.  See Birthfather Registries, supra note 168. 
 170.  See id.  As one scholar stated, 
At first glance, the attractiveness of a paternity registration system is that it appears to be 
a rather simple and inexpensive method to protect fathers’ parental rights in the adoption 
process, and, simultaneously, to provide a means to expedite and stabilize the adoption 
process by readily identifying which fathers are interested in assuming their rights and 
which are not. 
Laurence C. Nolan, Preventing Fatherlessness Through Adoption While Protecting the Parental 
Rights of Unwed Fathers: How Effective are Paternity Registries?, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. 
ADVOC. 289, 307–08 (2005). 
 171.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1039–42 (discussing various provisions of state 
putative father registries).  In 2003, the Florida Putative Father Registry, FLA STAT. ANN. § 63.054 
(West 2011), was enacted and subjected to criticism, because it created a legal presumption that all 
unwed fathers knew about the registry and its requirements.  See Timothy L. Arcaro, No More Secret 
Adoptions: Providing Unwed Biological Fathers with Actual Notice of the Florida Putative Father 
Registry, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 449, 449 (2008).  In Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., the Florida 
Supreme Court ruled that an unwed father must be served with actual notice of an intended adoption 
plan, and must be informed that he has thirty days to register with the Putative Father Registry.  963 
So. 2d 189, 202 (Fla. 2007). 
 172.  See Oren, supra note 146, at 267.  States that have enacted strict registry laws mainly seek to 
avoid putative fathers appearing late in the process and disrupting adoptions.  Id. at 269.  In some 
states, an unwed father is not excused from failing to register—even if the birth mother concealed 
her intent to place the child up for adoption.  See, e.g., Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 368–
69 (Minn. 2002) (applying MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2011)). 
 173.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 133.  This may mean that the court must publish notice of an 
adoption hearing if the father is unknown.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(c) (West 2011).  It 
could also mean that the person seeking the adoption must serve notice on the unknown father.  See, 
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-401(c)(3) (West 2011).  However, publication notice laws often 
invade the birth mother’s privacy interests and provide little protection to the unknown biological 
father if he never sees the publication.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 143–44. 
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Differing state laws create an array of problems—including which law 
applies if the adoption is contested.174  Furthermore, some states have held 
that birth fathers and mothers may be treated differently by law if the law is 
rationally related to the best interest of the child in a stable home,175 creating 
further issues as to the rights of the parties.  There has been movement 
toward enacting a national putative father registry database, in the interest of 
protecting the rights of unwed fathers, particularly in the interstate adoption 
context.176  A national putative father registry may be one possible solution 
to conflicts in interstate adoptions.177  Whatever the solution, “[t]he putative 
father who genuinely wants to parent his child and assume full custody 
should be given notice of the adoption so that he may ‘grasp’ his opportunity 
to develop a relationship with the child before it is too late.”178 
III.   CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
In applying the PKPA and considering if a proceeding is pending in 
another state, there are five key issues that need to be addressed.179  Since the 
PKPA adopts the basic language of the UCCJA, courts frequently use the 
two terms interchangeably,180 and this Comment will do likewise unless 
explicitly stated.  First, is there a “custody proceeding” covered by the 
UCCJA or the PKPA?181  Second, is there another proceeding “pending” 
when the petition is filed?182  Third, is the other court’s exercise of 
 
 174.  See Simpson, supra note 160, at 581–83.  One example of this is the case In re Baby Girl P., 
802 A.2d 1192 (N.H. 2002).  In that case, the court acknowledged that generally the laws of the 
forum state apply to adoption cases, but that rule is not strictly construed and a state may apply the 
laws of a foreign state.  Id. at 1194.  Ultimately, although the child was born in Arizona, New 
Hampshire law applied because the adoptive parents lived there and the mother indicated the 
adoption would take place under New Hampshire law.  Id. at 1193–95. 
 175.  See In re Jarrett, 660 N.Y.S. 2d 916, 915 (App. Div. 1997). 
 176.  See Mary Beck, A National Putative Father Registry, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 295, 298 (2007) 
[hereinafter National Registry].  In 2006, the Proud Father Act was introduced in the Senate.  
Protecting Rights of Unknowing Dads and Fostering Access To Help Encourage Responsibility 
(Proud Father) Act of 2006, S. 3803, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 177.  See infra notes 368–90 and accompanying text. 
 178.  Zdon, supra note 150, at 949.  As important as this interest is, it also must be balanced 
against the child’s need for stability and committed parents to raise it, as well as the mother’s 
interests.  Id. at 949–50. 
 179.  David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Pending Proceeding in Another State as Ground for 
Declining Jurisdiction Under § 6(a) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g), 20 A.L.R. 5TH 700 (1994). 
 180.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id.  This may bring up an issue of the point at which the proceeding is commenced.  See 
Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 349.  Some states use the time when the petition is 
filed, while others use the time when process is served.  Id. at 349–50.  In Doe v. Baby Girl, the 
court found that a birth father filing a petition in Illinois court did not give Illinois first-in-time 
jurisdiction, because the Illinois order was not a “custody determination,” with no pleadings and no 
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jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJA or PKPA?183  Fourth, 
has the other state’s proceeding been stayed?184  Finally, do any extenuating 
circumstances exist to override the UCCJA or PKPA?185  In addressing these 
questions, there are several provisions of the UCCJA and PKPA that need a 
closer look in their application. 
A.  Custody Proceeding 
The application of the UCCJA and PKPA to the adoption context has 
been the source of much controversy.186  Particularly in the adoption context, 
the lack of coherency and legal uniformity creates many problems.187  Unlike 
custody cases, in adoption cases, parental rights are fully severed.188  Thus, 
jurisdiction procedures under the PKPA or UCCJA may not be adequate for 
adoption cases.189 
Most courts have found that the PKPA applies to adoptions.190  In fact, 
some states expressly include adoptions in the language of their versions of 
the UCCJA.191  Based on both the plain language of the statute and the 
statute’s stated purpose of minimizing interstate disputes over child custody, 
it is logical to apply the PKPA to adoptions.192  In adoption proceedings, as 
 
written order.  657 S.E.2d 455, 461 (S.C. 2008).  Under that reasoning, the later in time order by 
South Carolina that determined custody made South Carolina the first-in-time court, giving it 
jurisdiction.  Id. 
 183.  Minneman, supra note 179. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id.  This topic is beyond the scope of this Comment and will not be addressed. 
 186.  See generally Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the 
Problem of Jurisdiction in Interstate Adoption: An Easy Fix?, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 621 (1990); Danny 
R. Veilleux, Annotation, What Types of Proceedings or Determinations Are Governed by the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
(PKPA), 78 A.L.R. 4TH 1028 (1990). 
 187.  See State and Federal Adoption Laws, supra note 132, at 37.  These discrepancies in 
interpretations between jurisdictions are even more troubling in the context of interstate adoptions.  
Id. 
 188.  See Interstate Custody, supra note 64, at 498.  “[A]doption is conceptually quite different 
from custody or guardianship because adoption involves a final and permanent termination of 
parental rights.”  Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 308. 
 189.  See Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 308. 
 190.  See, e.g., J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732, 739 (Ariz. 1995); In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 
196 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (adoption is a custody proceeding under UCCJA); E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 
A.2d 871, 876 (N.J. 1982); Doe v. Baby Girl, 657 S.E.2d 455, 463 (S.C. 2008); J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In 
re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702, 706 (Utah 2011). 
 191.  See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 75-a(4) (McKinney 2011) (“termination of parental 
rights”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103 (2011) (“termination of parental rights”). 
 192.  See J.M.W., 266 P.3d 702.  It is also significant that Congress has twice amended the PKPA 
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with custody determinations, a child may be subject to conflicting decrees 
from two different states.193  The Supreme Court of Georgia stated, “The 
application of the UCCJA to this adoption proceeding would have, among 
other things, prevented jurisdictional competition, promoted interstate 
cooperation, and, most importantly, prevented the continued disruption of a 
child’s life.”194 
However, several courts have held that the PKPA (or, equivalently, the 
UCCJA) does not apply to adoptions.195  While the text is in general terms, 
some argue that the UCCJA was specifically targeting custody awards after 
a family has been split apart by divorce or separation, situations which often 
lack stability.196  Some states expressly exclude adoption from their 
definition of a “custody proceeding” in their UCCJA.197  This position is 
supported by several factors.198  Adoption proceedings result in a permanent 
award of custody, which is not modifiable.199  Furthermore, certain terms 
under the PKPA that determine jurisdiction, such as home state and 
significant connection, are more difficult to apply in the interstate adoption 
context.200  Finally, state courts may manipulate the provisions of the PKPA 
to obtain the result they desire, focusing on either parental rights or the best 
 
and has not chosen to alter the language to exclude adoptions.  Id. 
 193.  See Souza v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1304, 1310 (Ct. App. 1987).  Furthermore, 
other purposes of the PKPA, like deterring abductions and promoting exchange of information, are 
furthered by its application to the adoption context.  Id. 
 194.  Gainey v. Olivo, 373 S.E.2d 4, 6–7 (Ga. 1988).  Applying the UCCJA to adoption would 
also give states a fixed set of rules to determine where jurisdiction exists.  See Hartfield, supra note 
186, at 623. 
 195.  See, e.g., Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 796 (W. Va. 1998) (UCCJA does not apply and 
govern adoption proceedings); William v. Knott, 690 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) 
(“[A]ctions to terminate parental rights are not child custody cases”). 
 196.  See Kay, supra note 116, at 712.  Furthermore, neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA include the 
word “adoption,” supporting an argument it was not meant to be included.  Id. at 713–14. 
 197.  See Hartfield, supra note 186, at 622–23; see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458-A:2 (III) 
(2011) (“This chapter does not govern an adoption proceeding or a proceeding pertaining to the 
authorization of emergency medical care for a child.”). 
 198.  See Crawford, supra note 74, at 100.  For a general discussion of the issues in applying the 
PKPA to interstate adoption, see id. at 120–30.  See also Kay, supra note 116, at 704 (arguing the 
UCCJA is not the answer to interstate adoption and states should enact the UAA). 
 199.  See Crawford, supra note 74, at 100; Kay, supra note 116, at 720 (arguing court orders 
granting adoptions are final judgments, making provisions of the UCCJA that deter modification 
unnecessary).  This provision becomes even more problematic in the adoption context if some courts 
decide adoption custody awards are modifiable, leading to unstable custody determinations.  See 
Crawford, supra note 74, at 108. 
 200.  See Crawford, supra note 74, at 100; see also Kay, supra note 116, at 717 (“[T]here is no 
‘home state’ in the vast majority of interstate stranger adoption cases, where the child is relinquished 
shortly after birth and taken to live in a different state with prospective adoptive parents who have 
had no prior contact with the child.”).  If there is no home state, multiple states may argue over 
significant connection jurisdiction, causing the very conflict the PKPA attempts to avoid.  See Kay, 
supra at 717. 
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interest of the child.201  In spite of this minority view, most courts have held 
that adoptions are custody proceedings, and that the UCCJA and PKPA are 
applicable.202  However, the inconsistency from state to state defeats the very 
purpose of the UCCJA, which is to create uniform application and 
interpretation.203 
B.  Home State 
The home state provision of the PKPA and UCCJA is particularly 
difficult to apply in the adoption context (especially for newborns) because, 
in most cases, the child has not lived in any state for more than six months 
and is often taken to a new state after birth.204  One approach taken by states 
is that if the baby “is born in one state, but within days of birth is transported 
to another State, the baby simply has no home state.”205  This essentially 
creates “a ‘race-to-the-courthouse’ rule of jurisdiction,” because the first 
state to be filed in will likely satisfy substantial connection jurisdiction.206  
Other courts have held that the birth state is the home state, as long as a 
parent continues to reside there.207  This lack of uniformity is one reason why 
 
 201.  See Crawford, supra note 74, at 101. 
 202.  See Gainey v. Olivo, 373 S.E.2d 4, 4 (Ga. 1988) (“[T]he UCCJA does apply to adoption 
proceedings.”); In re Custody of K.R., 897 P.2d 896, 899–900 (Colo. App. 1995) (adoptions 
“inherently determine custody issues”). 
 203.  See Hartfield, supra note 186, at 623. 
 204.  See Kay, supra note 116, at 717. 
 205.  See, e.g., Doe v. Baby Girl, 657 S.E.2d 455, 463 (S.C. 2008); see also Adoption of 
Zachariah K., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 430 (Ct. App. 1992); Rogers v. Platt, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 
1211–14 (Ct. App. 1988); In re Adoption of Baby Girl B., 867 P.2d 1074, 1079–80 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1994); In re Adoption of Child by T.W.C., 636 A.2d 1083, 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
 206.  See Waller, supra note 83, at 291.  Such a rule is more troublesome when applied in the 
adoption context.  Id. at 291–92.  In custody disputes between biological parents, both may have 
equal legal interests.  Id.  However, in the case of adoption, the biological parents have distinct 
interests from prospective adoptive parents.  Id. at 292.  See also infra notes 335–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 207.  See, e.g., Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d 940, 950 (Ala. 2007).  The Alabama Supreme Court 
interpreted the following rule based on the PKPA: 
[A] state that has home-state status remains the home state for up to six months after the 
child leaves that state if the following two conditions exist: (1) the reason for the child’s 
absence from the state is that a ‘contestant’ has removed the child from the state; and (2) 
‘a contestant continues to live in’ the state. 
Id.; see also Martinez v. Reed, 623 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. La. 1985) (“[A] child’s ‘home state’ is 
not destroyed by the fact that he or she is removed by a contestant to another state.”); In re Clausen, 
502 N.W.2d 649, 658–59 (Mich. 1993); In re Burk, 252 S.W.3d 736, 741 (Tex. App. 2008); 
Meyeres v. Meyeres, 196 P.3d 604, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
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the UCCJA and PKPA may be less applicable to adoptions.208 
C.  Substantial Conformity 
One of the alternative jurisdictional grounds of the PKPA allows a state 
to exercise jurisdiction if the prior state is not acting in substantial 
conformity with the PKPA.209  This often creates issues when a state uses 
this as grounds for obtaining jurisdiction and refuses to recognize the 
custody determinations of the other court.210  In addition, there is a strong 
argument that if the question of initial jurisdiction has already been decided 
in another state, in conformity with the UCCJA (or equivalently, the PKPA), 
then full faith and credit should be given to that decision, even if the later 
court, applying its own version of the law, would have come to a different 
conclusion.211  Even when the first state has not adopted the UCCJA, a court 
may still recognize that state’s custody determination if the former state was 
acting in substantial conformity with the later state’s UCCJA.212 
D.  Jurisdiction 
One key issue in interpreting the jurisdictional provisions of the PKPA 
is whether it refers to subject matter jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction.213  
The personal jurisdiction requirements of the PKPA are beyond the scope of 
this article.214  Subject matter jurisdiction is “jurisdiction over the nature of 
 
 208.  See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 209.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 210.  See, e.g., In re L.S., 257 P.3d 201, 205 (Colo. 2011) (refusing to recognize a custody 
determination from Nebraska where the child had lived in Colorado for more than six consecutive 
months, making Colorado, not Nebraska, the home state). 
 211.  See id. at 211 (Coats, J., dissenting).  As Justice Coats stated: 
Once the question of initial jurisdiction has been fully and finally litigated in another 
state, according to provisions in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA, that 
determination is entitled to credit, whether or not a court of this state would have reached 
the same conclusion.  To conclude otherwise not only undermines the fundamental 
rationale behind both the PKPA and UCCJEA, but also perpetuates a jurisdictional 
stalemate among the states and leaves unreconciled their competing enforcement orders. 
Id. 
 212.  See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Marcrum v. Marion Cnty. Superior Court, 403 N.E.2d 806, 808–09 
(Ind. 1980); Barcus v. Barcus, 278 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 1979). 
 213.  See Atwood, supra note 52, at 374–75.  In addition, some scholars categorize both of these 
as subject matter jurisdiction, with the distinction being “local subject matter jurisdiction” versus 
“territorial subject matter jurisdiction.”  See Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and 
Judgment Issues in Interstate Adoption Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 818 (2003).  However, many 
courts do not make this distinction and do not follow different rules for collateral attack based on 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 818, 835–36.  Under these rules, local subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, consent, or estoppel, but lack of territorial jurisdiction 
may be cured by estoppel.  Id. 
 214.  The Supreme Court in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953), ruled that a court must 
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the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on 
the conduct of persons or the status of things.”215  Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is “[a] court’s ability to exercise power beyond its territorial limits.”216  
Generally, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by 
waiver, consent, or estoppel, while territorial jurisdiction may be granted by 
estoppel.217  The issue of whether territorial jurisdiction is equivalent to 
subject matter jurisdiction or waivable is a matter debated outside the 
context of the PKPA.218  For instance, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
held in a criminal case that “[a]lthough territorial jurisdiction is not a 
component of subject matter jurisdiction, we hold that it is a fundamental 
issue that may be raised by a party or by a court at any point in the 
proceeding.”219 
Many courts have held that the PKPA creates an affirmative duty for a 
state court to question its jurisdiction when it learns of proceedings in 
another state.220  Courts have expressly stated that the jurisdictional 
 
have personal jurisdiction over a mother in order to deprive her of her right to custody of her 
children.  Even the holding in May left courts without clear guidance.  See Coombs, supra note 45, at 
737.  Some courts have interpreted May to mean that due process is violated if custody is awarded 
without personal jurisdiction over the parent, in accord with International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310 (1945).  Coombs, supra note 45, at 736.  However, other courts have interpreted May 
more narrowly, and, as such, have not reached the due process issue.  Id.  This disparity in treatment 
leads to a lengthy discussion that this article will not address, but for a further discussion of the 
relationship between personal jurisdiction and the UCCJA, see Comparative Ruminations, supra 
note 64, at 517–24.  See generally Atwood, supra note 52. 
 215.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).  By statute, a state may grant 
jurisdiction to exclusive courts, such as a court of domestic relations, foreclosing other courts in the 
state from exercising jurisdiction.  See Whitten, supra note 213, at 818. 
 216.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 394 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).  Other scholars have described 
territorial jurisdiction as “indicating that there are sufficient geographic connections between the 
dispute and the forum to support the forum court’s power.”  Atwood, supra note 52, at 376.  The 
sources of the rules of territorial jurisdiction are “the rules that define the political authority of the 
state itself,” such as the provisions of the Constitution.  See Whitten, supra note 213, at 826.  A state 
may always choose not to exercise the full range of territorial jurisdiction allowed under the 
Constitution.  Id.  Based on Supreme Court precedent, it is unclear if territorial rules of jurisdiction 
are incorporated in the Due Process Clause or if they are merely common law rules, allowing states 
to refuse to enforce the judgments of other states.  Id. at 829. 
 217.  See Whitten, supra note 213, at 835–36. 
 218.  See Emily Nanette Swalm, State v. Dudley: Defining the Theory of Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 55 S.C. L. REV. 543, 544, 568 (2004) (examining territorial jurisdiction in the criminal 
context and arguing that it should not be considered a component of subject matter jurisdiction, but 
still be capable of being raised for the first time on appeal). 
 219.  South Carolina v. Dudley, 614 S.E.2d 623, 625–26 (S.C. 2005).  The reasoning behind this 
is that territorial jurisdiction goes to a state’s sovereignty, which is an elemental question that cannot 
be waived, even by consent.  Id. 
 220.  See, e.g., Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613 So. 2d 717, 719–20 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Renno v. Evans, 
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provisions under the UCCJA “are equivalent to declarations of subject 
matter jurisdiction.”221  Several courts have held that, like subject matter 
jurisdiction, jurisdictional defects under the PKPA may be raised at any time 
and jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by consent.222  
Significantly, Brigitte Bodenheimer, a Reporter for the Special Committee 
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which prepared the 
UCCJA,223 specifically stated “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction . . . may not be 
conferred by the parties’ appearance in the proceedings.”224 
However, other courts have treated the jurisdictional provisions under 
the PKPA more like territorial considerations, such as venue, and therefore 
have held that lack of jurisdiction may be waived.225  If courts find that the 
PKPA does not refer to subject matter jurisdiction, they may rely on state 
statutes regulating adoption, which may grant jurisdiction to several states: 
the child’s domicile, the parent’s residence, the adoptive parent’s residence, 
or the adoption agency’s location.226  Under this standard, multiple states 
could have subject matter jurisdiction, disrupting the smooth resolution of 
interstate adoption and destabilizing relationships.227  These disparities in 
interpretation show the courts’ struggle to find the correct approach to child 
 
580 So. 2d 945, 947 (La. Ct. App. 1991); see also The Mobile Family, supra note 82, at 104 (“[A] 
court hearing an adoption petition should always inquire whether the child is subject to a prior 
custody or visitation order or pending custody proceeding in the adoption state or any other state.”). 
 221.  Renno, 580 So. 2d at 948. 
 222.  See, e.g., Leighton v. Leighton, 596 P.2d 8, 9–10 (Alaska 1979); Sholty v. Carruth, 616 P.2d 
918, 919 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Moore v. Richardson, 964 S.W.2d 377, 380–81 (Ark. 1998); Brooks 
v. Brooks, 546 So. 2d 100, 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Wambold v. Wambold, 651 A.2d 330, 
332 (Me. 1994). 
 223.  Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1207. 
 224.  Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 54, at 998.  Furthermore, Bodenheimer argues that 
the Commissioners specifically chose to not have jurisdiction by consent in order to further the 
purposes of the UCCJA.  Id. at 999. 
 225.  See, e.g., B.J.P. v. R.W.P., 637 A.2d 74, 78–79 (D.C. 1994).  That court stated: 
The purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on territorial considerations—a 
fair characterization of the asserted defect here—has been held to be analytically similar 
to improper venue; it does not go to the power of the court to adjudicate the case, and 
may be waived if not asserted in timely fashion. 
Id.; see also Williams v. Williams, 555 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ind. 1990); E.N. v. E.S., 852 N.E.2d 1104, 
1115 n.26 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).  Factors in support of this argument include the ability of courts to 
then accept consensual jurisdiction and to avoid belated objections.  See Atwood, supra note 52, at 
401–02.  Furthermore, the UCCJA § 5(d) allows notice requirements to be waived in the event of a 
party submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, perhaps suggesting that jurisdiction may also be 
waived by consent.  See Demelis, supra note 65, at 1352. 
 226.  See Kay, supra note 116, at 729.  Furthermore, others have argued that the provisions of the 
PKPA are more akin to jurisdictional requisites, not requirements imposed by federal law to obtain 
initial jurisdiction.  See Krauskopf, supra note 68, at 436.  Therefore, it is state law or the UCCJA 
that determines whether jurisdiction to make an initial order exists.  Id.  This is precisely what the 
Utah Supreme Court did in J.M.W.  See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 227.  See Kay, supra note 116, at 729. 
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custody jurisdiction.228  These two distinct views interpreting jurisdiction 
under federal legislation may make federal judicial review of state supreme 
court decisions an appropriate method for resolving issues related to PKPA 
interpretation.229 
IV.  RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE PKPA 
A.  J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. 
One recent example of a state supreme court attempting to apply the 
PKPA to an interstate adoption case is J.M.W.230  The facts on record paint a 
slightly different and less personal story than that put forth in the national 
news.231  In the case, a baby was born in Virginia to unwed parents, both 
residents of Virginia, on February 10, 2009.232  The mother had been in 
contact with an adoption agency prior to the birth, and, on February 12, she 
relinquished her parental rights and consented to the adoption.233  
Prospective adoptive parents were found, and, on February 17, they received 
permission to travel to Utah with the baby.234  The birth father initiated 
custody and visitation proceedings in Virginia the following day.235  While 
this case was pending, the prospective parents filed a Petition for Adoption 
on February 23 in a Utah Court.236  The birth father registered as the putative 
father of the baby in Virginia on April 8.237  On April 28, the birth father 
moved to contest the adoption in Utah and requested permission to 
intervene, but never raised the PKPA or challenged Utah’s jurisdiction.238 
The Utah court denied the motion, finding that the birth father had 
waived his rights to the child, could not intervene, and did not need to 
provide consent in order for the adoption to proceed.239  Back in Virginia, on 
 
 228.  See Atwood, supra note 52, at 375. 
 229.  See infra notes 345–49 and accompanying text. 
 230.  J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702 (Utah 2011). 
 231.  See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. 
 232.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 704–05. 
 233.  Id. at 705. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id.  This is because the birth father failed to meet Utah’s stringent requirements for 
establishing paternity.  See infra notes 251–57 and accompanying text. 
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December 11, 2009, the court issued an order giving the birth father custody 
of the child and holding that the Virginia court had exclusive jurisdiction 
under the PKPA.240  On appeal in Utah, the birth father raised the PKPA, 
arguing that it strips Utah of subject matter jurisdiction.241 
The Utah Supreme Court issued its decision on July 19, 2011, and first 
held that the PKPA applies to adoption proceedings and would thus be 
applicable in the case.242  However, the court then found that the PKPA was 
subject to waiver and did not deprive Utah of subject matter jurisdiction.243  
The court reasoned that “subject matter jurisdiction [is] when [a court] has 
‘the authority . . . to decide the case.’”244  Accordingly, the court focused on 
whether “the court has authority over the general class of cases,” not “on the 
specific facts presented by any individual case.”245  Under the Utah Code, 
Utah district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over custody 
proceedings.246  The court bolstered its findings by arguing that if Congress 
intended the PKPA to divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction, it would 
have clearly stated such intent.247  It also submitted that interpreting the 
PKPA to relate to subject matter jurisdiction would increase uncertainty in 
interstate adoptions because any decisions made by courts lacking 
jurisdiction would be void from the outset, capable of being collaterally 
attacked at any time after judgment.248  Furthermore, the court pointed out 
that the PKPA was not placed with other federal statutes dealing with 
judicial jurisdiction, but instead as an addendum to the full faith and credit 
statute.249  Based on these findings, the court held that the birth father could 
not raise the PKPA on appeal because he failed to raise it in the lower 
court.250 
 
 240.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 705. 
 241.  Id. at 706. 
 242.  Id.at 708.  Although the concurrence goes to great lengths to argue that, based on the 
statutory language, the statute’s purpose, and the statute’s legislative history, the PKPA does not 
apply to adoptions.  Id. at 722–23 (Lee, J., concurring). 
 243.  Id. at 710–11.  In doing this, the court overruled Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990).  In that case, the court held that a party making a general appearance did not waive her 
jurisdictional challenge under the PKPA.  Id. at 726.  The court expressly held that a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under the PKPA can be raised at any time and cannot be waived.  Id.  As an 
alternative argument to the majority’s holding in J.M.W., the concurrence finds—based on the 
“exercise” of jurisdiction language of the PKPA—that it is more comparable to territorial 
jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction.  266 P.3d at 718 (Lee, J., concurring).  Therefore, it is 
waived if not raised in the lower court.  Id. 
 244.  Id. at 711 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 234 P.3d 1100, 1102 (Utah 2010)). 
 245.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 711. 
 246.  Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-5-102(1) (West 2011)). 
 247.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 712. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id.  Because of this, the PKPA is subject to waiver, like full faith and credit claims.  Id. 
 250.  Id. at 712. 
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After reaching this decision, the court then assessed whether the birth 
father waived his right to withhold consent to the adoption, applying Utah 
law.251  Under Utah law, an unwed father’s consent is not required for 
adoption unless he files a paternity action in a Utah court prior to the time 
the mother consents to the adoption.252  He may preserve his right to refuse 
consent if he meets three requirements.253  First, he must have reasonably 
lacked knowledge of a qualifying circumstance.254  Next, he must meet all 
requirements to establish parental rights, either in the last state where the 
mother resided or in the state where the child was conceived.255  Finally, the 
unwed father must show a “full commitment to his parental 
responsibilities.”256  Under these requirements, the court found that the birth 
father did not establish his parental rights under Virginia law until after the 
mother had consented to the adoption.257 
B.  Ex parte D.B. 
Other state supreme courts have interpreted the jurisdictional provisions 
of the PKPA as relating to subject matter jurisdiction, which is not subject to 
waiver, and have declined to exercise jurisdiction on those grounds.258  One 
such example of this is the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte D.B.259  In 
that case, the child was born in Nebraska to Nebraska residents on January 
21, 2004.260  The mother placed the child into the physical custody of the 
adoptive parents on January 25.261  The birth father did not learn of the 
potential adoption until January 30, at which point he filed notice of his 
 
 251.  Id. at 713. 
 252.  Id. at 704 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(3) (West 2011)). 
 253.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 713. 
 254.  Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(A) (West 2011)). 
 255.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 713 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B)). 
 256.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 713 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(C)). 
 257.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 713.  The mother consented to the adoption on February 12, but the 
birth father did not file a custody proceeding in Virginia until February 18 and did not register with 
the Putative Father Registry until April 8.  Id.  The court found that either of these steps would have 
established the birth father’s parental rights under Virginia law.  Id.  However, interestingly, the 
Virginia court apparently found that the birth father had adequately asserted his rights under Virginia 
law, because it granted him custody.  See id. at 704. 
 258.  See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 259.  975 So. 2d 940 (Ala. 2007). 
 260.  Id. at 942. 
 261.  Id. 
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intent to claim paternity and obtain custody in Nebraska.262  On February 2, 
the adoptive parents moved with the child to Alabama and initiated an 
adoption proceeding there on February 12.263  Shortly thereafter, the adoptive 
parents were awarded custody by the Alabama court.264  In Nebraska, the 
father filed a petition on February 20 to adjudicate his claim of paternity and 
right to custody.265  On March 17, a pretrial hearing was held with the birth 
father and mother present, as well as the attorney for the adoptive parents, 
but no official appearance was made on their behalf.266  The Nebraska court 
found that it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the 
case.267  In Alabama, the birth father moved to stay the adoption proceedings 
on March 30.268 
The Nebraska court held a trial on April 21, without the mother 
present.269  According to the birth father’s testimony, he attempted to 
maintain contact with the mother and sought to participate in the upbringing 
of the child.270  The child was put up for adoption without the father’s 
consent, and notice of the potential adoption was mailed to the wrong 
address, so the birth father did not receive it.271  Notice of the potential 
adoption was also posted in a local newspaper and stated that the father had 
until five days after February 12 to file notice of his intent to claim 
paternity.272  Based on these findings, the Nebraska court granted the father 
physical custody and all rights.273  Six days later, the Nebraska court 
supplemented the judgment, ordering that the adoption proceedings in 
Alabama be dismissed.274  The father moved to enforce the Nebraska 
judgment in Alabama on April 29.275  On May 10, the adoption proceeding 
was transferred from the probate court to the juvenile court, upon the request 
of the adoptive parents.276  In the juvenile court, the adoptive couple filed a 
 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Id.  This fact is crucial to the court’s holding that the “reasonable notice and opportunity to 
be heard” requirement of the PKPA was not met, because although the adoptive couple had actual 
notice, there was no attempt at service of process.  Id. at 955. 
 267.  Id. at 942. 
 268.  Id. at 943. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id.  The father filed his notice of intent on January 30, well within the timeframe allotted.  
Id. 
 273.  Id. at 944. 
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. 
06 MILLER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:20 PM 
[Vol. 40: 735, 2013] Where Can the Unwed Father Turn? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
767 
response to the birth father’s motion to dismiss on June 4, claiming that the 
Nebraska judgment was invalid because they had not been served.277  On 
September 22, the juvenile court entered a judgment, finding that 
jurisdiction was proper in Nebraska, Nebraska had never given up 
jurisdiction, and the case should be transferred to Nebraska.278  Ultimately, 
the adoptive parents appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court.279 
The Alabama Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the home state 
provision.280  It held that Alabama could not be the home state because the 
child was born in Nebraska and moved to Alabama after birth to live with 
the adoptive parents.281  Next, the court found that, although the birth father 
did not file his action in Nebraska until eight days after the adoptive parents 
filed their action in Alabama, Nebraska still had priority jurisdiction as the 
child’s home state.282  In support of this argument, the court found that a 
state remains the home state for up to six months after the child leaves if 
both (1) the child left the state because a “contestant” removed the child and 
(2) a “contestant” continues to live in the state.283  Nebraska was therefore 
the home state because the child was born in Nebraska and was taken from 
the state by the adoptive parents—contestants—while the father—also a 
contestant—remained in the state.284 
While Nebraska may have been the home state, the Alabama Supreme 
Court next addressed whether the judgment was enforceable, requiring for 
enforceability that Nebraska have been exercising jurisdiction consistent 
with the PKPA.285  The PKPA requires that the adoptive parents be given 
notice of the proceedings in Nebraska.286  Although the adoptive parents had 
actual notice, they were never given service of process.287  Therefore, 
 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id. at 946. 
 280.  Id. at 947. 
 281.  Id. at 948. 
 282.  Id. at 949–50. 
 283.  Id. at 950; see also supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 284.  Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d at 950. 
 285.  Id. at 951; see also supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text. 
 286.  Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d at 951.  The text of the PKPA states: “Before a child custody or 
visitation determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the 
contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person 
who has physical custody of a child.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e) (2006). 
 287.  Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d at 951.  Although the birth father contended that actual notice was 
sufficient, the court ultimately held that there was a lack of proper notice and service of process.  Id. 
at 953–54. 
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Nebraska did not have personal jurisdiction over the adoptive parents 
because no notice was given, meaning the Nebraska judgment did not 
substantially conform to the PKPA.288  Thus, the Nebraska judgment was not 
enforceable in Alabama.289  However, it does not necessarily follow that 
Alabama may exercise jurisdiction.290  Nebraska, as the home state, is still 
the preferred jurisdiction under the PKPA, and Alabama cannot exercise 
significant-connection jurisdiction.291  Therefore, the case was transferred to 
Nebraska, and Alabama terminated all proceedings.292 
C.  Analysis of Interpretation of Jurisdiction Under the PKPA 
The interpretation of the PKPA in J.M.W. sets a dangerous precedent.293  
While there are various provisions subject to multiple interpretations and 
creating confusion, such as custody proceeding, home state, and substantial 
conformity,294 the application of the jurisdictional provisions of the PKPA is 
particularly troublesome.295  Ultimately, the issue becomes one of whether 
the jurisdictional provisions of the PKPA refer to subject matter jurisdiction 
or territorial jurisdiction. 
J.M.W.296 and Ex parte D.B.297 show how two courts may reach opposite 
conclusions when faced with similar situations—namely, newborn babies 
being transported across state lines for adoption.  The court in J.M.W. 
completely ignored the prior proceedings in Virginia and concluded that it 
properly exercised jurisdiction.298  In contrast, the court in Ex parte D.B. 
deferred to the prior proceedings in Nebraska, even though Nebraska was 
not exercising jurisdiction in accordance with the PKPA.299 
The difference in these interpretations has the greatest impact on the 
party with the burden of challenging jurisdiction.  Under the holding in 
J.M.W., the unwed father has the burden to raise the PKPA in the lower 
 
 288.  Id. at 953. 
 289.  Id. at 955. 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Id. at 956. 
 292.  Id. at 944. 
 293.  The Utah Supreme Court has already relied on J.M.W. in another case, holding jurisdictional 
claims under the PKPA to be waived if not raised in the district court.  Donjuan v. McDermott, 266 
P.3d 839, 843 (Utah 2011). 
 294.  See supra notes 186–212 and accompanying text.  In addition, the weight given by courts to 
the child’s best interests as opposed to the biological parents’ rights may lead to different outcomes 
in two states faced with similar facts.  See Crawford, supra note 74, at 122. 
 295.  See supra notes 213–29 and accompanying text. 
 296.  J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702 (Utah 2011). 
 297.  Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d 940. 
 298.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 704. 
 299.  Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d at 956. 
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court, or he waives the right to raise it on appeal.300  In Ex parte D.B., even 
though the unwed father did not raise the PKPA in the lower court, the court 
deferred to Nebraska because it found that it did not have jurisdiction under 
the PKPA since it was not the home state.301  This is consistent with other 
courts that have placed the burden of evaluating jurisdiction and inquiring 
into proceedings in other states on the court.302 
While state courts are without Supreme Court precedent to aid them in 
interpreting the PKPA, looking to the intent behind the Act is useful in 
determining which interpretation Congress intended.303  The purpose of the 
PKPA was to resolve interstate custody disputes in a uniform manner and 
prevent conflicting custody decrees.304  In J.M.W., the court’s interpretation 
resulted in two conflicting custody decrees: one from Utah granting the 
adoption and one from Virginia giving the unwed father custody.305  The 
holding in Ex parte D.B. resulted in only one court, Nebraska, assuming 
jurisdiction to make the custody determination.306  Looking solely at 
promoting the purpose of the PKPA, the holding in Ex parte D.B. aligns 
with the intent behind the PKPA because there are not two conflicting 
custody decrees; in contrast, the court’s decision in J.M.W. results in the 
very problem the PKPA sought to fix, namely two courts issuing different 
custody decrees.307  These inconsistencies have widespread impact and have 
resulted in various calls for reform.308 
V.  PROBLEMS WITH UNCERTAINTY 
A.  Problems for Unwed Fathers 
Uncertainty in the interpretation and application of the PKPA creates 
myriad problems for unwed fathers.  For example, it is unclear whether a 
state should defer to the substantive and procedural laws of another state in 
 
 300.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 705; see also supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 301.  Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d at 949–50. 
 302.  See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text. 
 303.  See Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 54, at 998–99.  Bodenheimer, in assessing the 
UCCJA—which has provisions similar to the PKPA—reasons that the purposes of the UCCJA are 
promoted by not allowing jurisdiction by consent.  Id. 
 304.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 305.  J.M.W., 266 P.3d at 702, 713. 
 306.  Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d at 956. 
 307.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 308.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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which the birth parent may be located.309  This issue is further aggravated by 
varying state laws for consent, relinquishment, and termination.310  The 
impact of this was seen in J.M.W., where the father followed Virginia law 
for establishing paternity but failed to follow the stringent requirements of 
Utah law and lost custody of his child because of it.311  There are also 
differences among state laws for birth father notification requirements.312  
Birth fathers who fail to initially contest the adoption face an even tougher 
battle in appealing the adoption, often taking several years to resolve the 
conflict.313 
As culture and society have evolved, previous stereotypes regarding 
unwed fathers may no longer be applicable or representative of reality.314  
With today’s higher birth rate to unmarried women and dating standards, a 
 
 309.  See The Mobile Family, supra note 82, at 99.  There is a tension between the argument that 
the state with subject matter jurisdiction should apply its substantive laws because of “significant 
connections” and the argument that it is more appropriate to apply the substantive law of the state in 
which the parent attempts to oppose the adoption.  Id.  In terms of the actual adoption, the 
substantive law is the law of the forum state.  See Whitten, supra note 213, at 805–06. 
 310.  See The Mobile Family, supra note 82, at 100. 
 311.  See supra note 251–57 and accompanying text.  Another interesting example of this is 
H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 203 P.3d 943, 951 (Utah 2009), where the court held that the putative father failed 
to meet the requirements under Arizona law and knew the birth mother was in Utah.  In that case, the 
mother served notice of the pending adoption to two men and published the notice in Arizona 
newspapers.  Id. at 946–47.  The putative father filed a Notice of Claim of Paternity and later filed a 
petition for paternity but not within the thirty days required and failed to properly serve the mother, 
leading to his petition being denied.  Id. at 947.  The putative father was aware that the mother had 
moved to Utah but did not file any petitions there.  Id.  Distinguishably, in J.M.W., the birth father 
met the Virginia statutory requirements and was granted custody in the Virginia court.  J.M.W. v. 
T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702, 704 (Utah 2011).  Furthermore, in H.U.F., the 
Arizona court ceded jurisdiction.  203 P.3d at 953.  For a general discussion of H.U.F. and the rights 
of unwed fathers in Utah, see Deborah Bulkeley, Note, Who’s My Daddy?! A Call for Expediting 
Contested Adoption Cases in Utah, 12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 225 (2010). 
 312.  See Simpson, supra note 160, at 581.  As one author observed: 
Based on the author’s observations over seventeen years in this field, there is a great deal 
of confusion as to really knowing what law will apply in the event of disputes such as 
whether the birth father responded within the time required or whether his response time 
has expired; or, whether the birth father was properly given notice or deprived of that 
right. 
Id. at 581 n.39. 
 313.  See Bulkeley, supra note 311, at 231.  For instance, since 1999, the average time to finalize 
a contested adoption in Utah is almost three years.  Id. 
 314.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  Even in the 1870s and 1880s, some courts 
acknowledged that fathers could be more fit than mothers.  See, e.g., Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27, 30 
(1881) (“As between the father, too, and the mother . . . the father is generally to be preferred.”); 
McShan v. McShan, 56 Miss. 413, 415 (1879) (“[T]he husband, as head of the family . . . has, 
therefore, a better right to their custody.”).  However, there are still some who believe the rights of 
the father should not be favored over the rights of the mother and the best interest of the child.  See 
Michelle Kaminsky, Note, Excessive Rights for Putative Fathers: Heart of Adoptions Jeopardizes 
Rights of Mother and Child, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 917, 922 (2008). 
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new solution is needed to protect the rights of unwed fathers.315  Our society 
has been moving toward greater equality between genetic mothers and 
genetic fathers, whether or not they are married.316  While the Supreme Court 
has recognized some rights of unwed fathers,317 the lack of clarity in its 
holdings has given the states little guidance for solving the problem of 
unwed fathers in the adoption context.318  Some states, such as Louisiana, 
have gone so far as to say an unwed father has “a liberty interest within the 
protection of due process” in his child.319  On the other end of the spectrum, 
Utah has some of the most stringent requirements for an unwed father to 
assert his rights.320  Most states fall somewhere in the middle and are willing 
to recognize the rights of unwed fathers if they have indicated a desire to 
form a relationship.321  There may always be some inequality between 
mothers and fathers, simply based on the fact that the mother’s identity is 
verifiable from birth.322  However, the paternity interests of unwed fathers 
 
 315.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1077. 
 316.  See Parness & Arado, supra note 29, at 207.  Both recent court decisions and statutes 
enacted show support of this trend.  Id. at 207–09. 
 317.  See supra note 136–59 and accompanying text. 
 318.  See Resnik, supra note 115, at 389–90. 
 319.  In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 551 (La. 1990). 
 320.  The Utah Supreme Court has stated: “a biological relationship alone is insufficient to 
establish constitutionally protected parental rights.”  In re Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967, 970 
(Utah 1999); see also Bulkeley, supra note 311, at 227 (stating that in addition to requiring unwed 
fathers to register before birth, Utah adds the burden of requiring a statutory outlined paternity action 
to be filed). 
 321.  New York has recognized the unusual nature in an unwed father being able to establish a 
relationship with his newborn child and held: 
[I]n an adoption proceeding by strangers, an unwed father who has been physically 
unable to have a full custodial relationship with his newborn child is also entitled to the 
maximum protection of his relationship, so long as he promptly avails himself of all the 
possible mechanisms for forming a legal and emotional bond with his child. 
In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y. 1990). 
 322.  See Parness & Arado, supra note 29, at 209–10.  Some courts specifically recognize the 
responsibilities of an unwed mother, who is: 
[F]aced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a newborn 
child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions 
regarding her future and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding the 
permanence of an adoptive placement. 
In re Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d at 970–71 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.12(2)(b) (West 
1996), repealed by 2008 Utah Laws ch. 3, § 1474).  Furthermore, “The birthmother is responsible 
for the child during pregnancy and her financial obligations arise immediately upon the child’s 
birth.”  In re Jarrett, 660 N.Y.S.2d 916, 925 (App. Div. 1997). 
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still need to be fully respected in adoption laws to give them the full rights 
they deserve.323 
B.  Problems for Children 
Jurisdiction in the child custody and adoption contexts requires different 
considerations than in typical cases, due mostly to the fact that it is the child, 
not the parents, who may have the greatest interest in the outcome of the 
litigation.  Yet, this generally plays a passive role in the litigation.324  As 
stated in the core values of the Child Welfare League of America, “All 
children have a right to receive care, protection, and love.”325  The court can 
never forget that “[a] custody dispute is more than a jurisdictional chess 
game in which winning depends on compliance with predetermined rules of 
play.  A child is not a pawn.”326  Generally speaking, courts use the “best 
interests of the child” doctrine in making decisions, meaning they act “in 
whatever manner best advances the child’s position.”327  Most courts 
presume that it is in the best interest of the child to remain with one or both 
of the birth parents.328  However, not all courts weigh this preference equally 
and will balance the best interests of the child with the rights of the 
parents.329  Furthermore, many birth parents themselves may be unfit, and it 
could be in the best interest of the child to be raised by adoptive parents.330  
 
 323.  See Parness & Arado, supra note 29, at 219. 
 324.  See Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 294. 
 325.  Child Welfare League of America, Adoption as a Child Welfare Service: CWLA 2000 
Standards, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER, supra note 132, at 45. 
 326.  E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 A.2d 871, 879 (N.J. 1982).  Furthermore, “The ones who suffer most 
from the increased litigation resulting from state custody law disparity are the children whose home 
lives are at stake.”  Cleveland, supra note 69, at 150–51. 
 327.  See McGinnis, supra note 134, at 314.  However, states interpret and apply this standard 
differently.  Id. at 313.  Furthermore, defining what is in the best interest of the child is never an easy 
task.  Id. at 331.  One solution may be to provide an extensive list of factors for courts to consider.  
Id. 
 328.  See Carrie L. Wambaugh, Comment, Biology is Important, But Does Not Necessarily 
Always Constitute a “Family”: A Brief Survey of the Uniform Adoption Act, 32 AKRON L. REV. 791, 
796 (1999).  This is further reflected in state parentage laws that make the birth mother the legal 
parent.  See James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the Rights of 
Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 766 (2009). 
 329.  See Kassab, supra note 45, at 425–26.  There is a danger in relying solely on the best interest 
of the child, and most states require some showing of parental unfitness for a child to be removed 
from the custody of a birth parent.  See Nale v. Robinson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn. 1994) 
(invalidating portion of a statute that allowed adoption based solely on the best interest of the child, 
regardless of the lack of judicial termination of the father’s parental rights); Resnik, supra note 115, 
at 410.  But see In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 671 (D.C. 1993) (granting adoption based on 
findings that adoption was in child’s best interest). 
 330.  See Dwyer, supra note 328, at 756–57.  However, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
right of parents to rear their children—preventing state interference, and generally finding that a 
child is better off with his or her biological parents.  See Comparative Ruminations, supra note 64, at 
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While older children can voice their opinions and preferences about where 
they would like to live, it is uncertain whether newborn children have any 
constitutional rights in the adoption process.331  Whatever is in the newborn 
child’s best interest, the child deserves to have a smooth and certain adoptive 
process, unimpeded by an unknown or non-participating father, if he does 
not wish to assert his rights.332  In fact, many courts emphasize the child’s 
best interest as a deciding factor, even over the language of the statute.333  
However, legislation that does not adequately protect the rights of unwed 
fathers may deny a child the chance to have a relationship with his or her 
biological father.334 
C.  Problems for Adoptive Parents 
Uncertainty in litigation also disrupts any bond formed between a child 
and prospective adoptive parents, who may have raised the child since 
birth.335  While it is not often that a biological father will emerge to contest 
an adoption, that potential alone may make couples hesitant to adopt.336  The 
biological father may not always prevail, but, either way, there remains the 
uncertainty and personal toll inherent in a custody fight.337  The different 
uniform legislations vary in the degree of consideration given to the adoptive 
parents.338  For instance, the UCCJEA considers the residence of the birth 
 
452–53.  Often the custody battle may come down to both the natural and adoptive parents asserting 
that it is in the best interest of the child to live with them.  See Waller, supra note 83, at 272. 
 331.  See Dwyer, supra note 328, at 758.  Based on Supreme Court decisions, a child is a person 
with rights under the Constitution.  Id. at 790.  However, the Supreme Court has not considered 
whether a newborn child has constitutional rights with respect to adoptions, such as avoiding a legal 
parent-child relationship.  Id. at 758. 
 332.  See National Registry, supra note 176, at 297.  There may also be an interest based on 
substantive due process, equal protection, and freedom of religion in a child “being reared by the 
person with whom they have established a sense of love, security, and stability.”  See Jurisdiction 
and Procedure, supra note 70, at 376.  Furthermore, “minimum delay in the adoption process and 
finality of adoption fosters the child’s sense of well-being and adjustment.”  Nolan, supra note 170, 
at 296. 
 333.  See Crawford, supra note 74, at 124.  To quote one court: “In exercising its discretion within 
the confines of UCCJA and PKPA, a court should consider not only the literal wording of the 
statutes but their purpose: to define and stabilize the right to custody in the best interest of the child.”  
E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 A.2d 871, 879–80 (N.J. 1982). 
 334.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1055. 
 335.  See Barton, supra note 131, at 141–42; Resnik, supra note 115, at 365. 
 336.  See Resnik, supra note 115, at 365.  Furthermore, state and national legislatures cannot 
ignore the issue merely because of the small number of unwed father custody disputes.  Id. 
 337.  See id. 
 338.  See The Mobile Family, supra note 82, at 93. 
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parents, while the UAA focuses on the residence of the adoptive parents.339  
Ultimately, for all parties involved, “[a]dopted children, birth mothers, 
unmarried birth fathers, adoptive parents, and their respective attorneys 
require a solution upon which they can comfortably rely.”340 
VI.   POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The PKPA has been criticized in various contexts for its failure to create 
uniform interpretation and application in child custody disputes.341  This 
Comment specifically addresses the issue of waiver of jurisdiction under the 
PKPA.342  Uncertainty in interpretation of this issue has a wide impact on 
unwed fathers, children, and adoptive parents.343  There are several potential 
solutions that could resolve this uncertainty and lead to more uniform 
interpretation and application.344 
A.  Federal Judicial Review of State Supreme Court Interpretations 
The most promising solution to assist in interpretation of the PKPA is 
federal judicial review.345  As one scholar stated, “It would take very few 
Supreme Court decisions to determine which of several conflicting 
interpretations of specific portions of the act are controlling.”346  There is 
sufficient case law to establish a split among the states as to whether 
jurisdiction under the PKPA is waivable.347  Under the rules of the Supreme 
Court, conflict between two state supreme courts is one ground for granting 
a petition for writ of certiorari.348  The PKPA is national legislation, meaning 
PKPA cases involve a federal question and review by federal courts is 
appropriate.349 
 
 339.  See id. at 94. 
 340.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1037. 
 341.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 342.  See supra notes 293–308 and accompanying text. 
 343.  See supra notes 309–40 and accompanying text. 
 344.  See infra notes 345–407 and accompanying text. 
 345.  See Demelis, supra note 65, at 1371. 
 346.  Charlow, supra note 61, at 312. 
 347.  See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text. 
 348.  SUP. CT. R. 10.  A petition for writ of certiorari may be granted if “[a] state court of last 
resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another 
state court of last resort.”  Id. 
 349.  See Christine L. Jones, The Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act: Is There New Hope For a 
(Limited) Federal Forum?, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 141, 174 (2008). 
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B.  Federal Cause of Action 
Closely related, yet distinct from Supreme Court review of state 
supreme court decisions, is allowing a cause of action in federal district 
courts in the event of conflicting state custody orders under the PKPA.350  
Aside from the Supreme Court’s rejection of this remedy of federal question 
jurisdiction,351 there are several other barriers to this being an effective 
solution, such as overburdening the federal courts, as well as the time and 
money required to appeal.352  However, there is still some logic to allowing a 
limited federal forum, which may reduce delays and eliminate confusion in 
interstate custody disputes.353  Furthermore, enforcement by federal courts 
guards against the “notorious local prejudice” of state courts,354 which 
caused so many problems even before the UCCJA and PKPA.355  This could 
mean as little as allowing federal courts to determine which state has 
jurisdiction, without making an actual custody determination.356  This entails 
interpretation of a federal statute regarding full faith and credit, a matter with 
which federal courts are fully familiar.357  In fact, prior to Thompson, several 
circuit courts allowed a cause of action for violation of the PKPA, stating: 
“We cannot believe that Congress intended to render § 1738A virtually 
nugatory by so restricting the availability of a federal forum that state 
 
 350.  See id. at 144–45.  Alternatively, if the parents are from different states, jurisdiction could be 
found based on diversity of citizenship, outside the PKPA.  See Krauskopf, supra note 68, at 442.  
Although, to satisfy diversity jurisdiction, tort damages would need to meet the amount in 
controversy requirement.  Id. 
 351.  Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 186–87 (1988).  “Instructing the federal courts to 
play Solomon where two state courts have issued conflicting custody orders would entangle them in 
traditional state-law questions that they have little expertise to resolve.”  Id. at 186.  The Supreme 
Court also based its holding on an examination of the intent of Congress in passing the PKPA, 
finding no intent to provide a cause of action in federal courts.  Id. at 185.  Some find support in later 
Supreme Court holdings, and suggest that there may be precedent for a limited federal forum to 
resolve jurisdictional conflicts, relying on Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299 (2006) (federal 
action allowed in spite of probate exception), and Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 
Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005) (federal forum for federal tax litigation).  
See Jones, supra note 349, at 172. 
 352.  See Demelis, supra note 65, at 1371.  The cost factor alone would prevent most parents from 
appealing.  Id.  In addition, after a lengthy appeal, the child may no longer be a minor.  Id. 
 353.  See Jones, supra note 349, at 144. 
 354.  Krauskopf, supra note 68, at 442.  In addition, “Federal enforcement would make effective 
the policy of the PKPA by finally insuring uniform national standards for jurisdiction to enforce and 
to modify child custody determinations, which could significantly reduce child abduction.”  Id. at 
454. 
 355.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 356.  See Jones, supra note 349, at 144. 
 357.  See Charlow, supra note 61, at 322. 
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compliance with the legislation would become optional.”358  Furthermore, 
the traditional view that family law is the exclusive territory of state courts 
has been eroding over the past thirty years, making a federal cause of action 
more reasonable.359 
C.  The UAA 
The UAA was proposed in 1994 in an attempt to create uniformity in 
adoption laws.360  While the Act gives greater procedural protections and 
provides more information about a child’s background, it has been subject to 
criticism.361  Most importantly for the context of newborn adoption, it lacks 
consent rights for unwed fathers, basically requiring birth fathers to marry—
or attempt to marry—the birth mother.362  Furthermore, it has not been 
widely enacted.363  Without widespread enactment, the legislation is not truly 
uniform, and issues arise if one state has adopted the UAA while another has 
not.364  However, some argue that the UAA would provide certainty, 
stability, and expeditious resolution of adoption disputes.365  It would also 
make adoption laws compatible across the country and eliminate challenges 
that so often impede the adoption process, such as notice and timing.366  
Furthermore, in terms of preventing child abductions, the UAA tracks minor 
children placed for adoption, discouraging unlawful placements.367 
 
 358.  Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 
1473, 1476 (4th Cir. 1987); Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430, 431 (4th Cir. 1986); McDougald v. 
Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1475 (11th Cir. 1986).  But see Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 694–95 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
 359.  See Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 269–70 (2009).  However, for the argument that states should 
remain sovereign over family law, see generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995). 
 360.  State and Federal Adoption Laws, supra note 132, at 38. 
 361.  Id.  Among these criticisms are that the Act: favors adoptive parents, over protects the birth 
parents’ right to place their children directly, and insufficiently addresses the needs of adopted 
children to access their original birth certificates.  Id.  Many groups have opposed the UAA, because 
it “does not allow genetic ties by themselves to trump the interests of children in having secure legal 
and psychological ties to the people who are actually parenting them.”  Joan Heifetz Hollinger, 
Analysis of the Proposed Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) of 1994, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION 
READER, supra note 132, at 47 [hereinafter Analysis of the Proposed UAA]. 
 362.  See Resnik, supra note 115, at 416–17.  This becomes even more of an issue when a unwed 
father does not know of the child’s birth, making it impossible for him to provide support or 
communicate with the child.  See Arzt, supra note 111, at 868–69. 
 363.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 364.  See Waller, supra note 83, at 304–05.  There is also the issue of states adopting varying 
versions of the UAA, as occurred with the UCCJA.  Id. at 305. 
 365.  See Wambaugh, supra note 328, at 832.  For a general discussion in favor of enactment of 
the UAA over the UCCJA and PKPA for adoptions, see Kay, supra note 116. 
 366.  See Simpson, supra note 160, at 589. 
 367.  See Analysis of the Proposed UAA, supra note 361, at 49. 
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D.  National Putative Father Registry 
A national putative father registry is another possible solution that 
would help protect the rights of unwed fathers and reduce the number of 
contested adoptions, although it would not resolve opposing interpretations 
of the PKPA.368  Such a registry would protect the parental rights of 
responsible fathers and provide permanency for adopted children where the 
birth father has not assumed responsibility.369  Congress considered 
legislation that would implement a database through the Proud Father Act370 
in 2006.371  Ultimately, the Proud Father Act was not enacted, but its 
proposal shows movement toward legislation to protect the rights of unwed 
fathers and increase the efficiency and stability of interstate adoptions.372  
Model uniform legislation does exist in the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),373 
providing a model for state putative father registries, but with no national 
database.374  In the concurrence to Ex parte D.B., Justice Bolin submitted 
that as our society becomes increasingly mobile, state putative father 
registries are less capable of protecting the interests of unwed fathers.375  He 
also argued, “A national putative-father registry would further protect 
against extended litigation caused by multijurisdictional disputes as is the 
case here.”376 
 
 368.  See National Registry, supra note 176, at 297.  A complement or alternative to a putative 
father registry might be requiring and clarifying paternity laws with voluntary paternity 
requirements.  See generally Parness, supra note 166. 
 369.  See National Registry, supra note 176, at 297. 
 370.  Protecting Rights of Unknowing Dads and Fostering Access to Help Encourage 
Responsibility (Proud Father) Act of 2006, S. 3803, 109th Cong. (2006).  The Proud Father Act 
defined a putative father as “a man who has had sexual relations with a woman to whom he is not 
married and is therefore [on notice] that such woman may be pregnant as a result of such relations.”  
Id. § 440(8). 
 371.  See National Registry, supra note 176, at 298. 
 372.  See id. 
 373.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9A U.L.A. 579 (1979). 
 374.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1049.  The UPA requires a father to register 
prior to the child’s birth or within thirty days of birth in order to receive notice of proceedings.  
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 402(a).  However, the UPA has only been enacted in nine states to date.  
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Refs. & Annos. 
 375.  Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d 940, 964 (Ala. 2007) (Bolin, J., concurring). 
 376.  Id. at 967.  Justice Bolin goes further to say that a national putative-father registry would not 
be hard to implement.  Id.  In closing, he “call[s] upon Congress to stop this madness—stop this 
madness before another father, another child, and another adoptive family endure this inconceivable 
and inconsolable heartache.”  Id. at 969. 
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There are several benefits to a national putative father registry.  The first 
is that it would reduce problems with notice of adoptions to unwed fathers.377  
Instead of needing to publish notice or provide personal service, courts in an 
adoption case would merely have to search the database.378  Second, a 
national putative father registry gives greater privacy and safety to the birth 
mother, who no longer has to name sexual partners or publish notice.379  
Third, a national registry provides adoptive parents with greater security that 
the adoption will not be contested or reversed.380  Finally, it may also resolve 
jurisdictional issues by having states amend their long arm statutes, which  
grant jurisdiction over registered fathers, and thereby prevent multiple state 
court actions.381 
A national putative father registry is not without its critics.382  One issue 
is that many men are unaware that registries exist and that they need to 
register for their rights to be protected.383  One commentator stated: 
“[P]ractically, registries are ineffective in protecting the father’s parental 
rights because most fathers are unaware of their existence.”384  There are also 
constitutional issues regarding the unwed father’s ignorance of the 
conception and the burdens of requiring registration.385  The Supreme Court 
addressed the constitutionality of putative father registries in general in Lehr, 
and held that an unwed father who did not register with the putative father 
registry was not denied equal protection rights.386  With a putative father 
registry, the rights of the child could be affected, because the child may be 
denied the opportunity to be raised by a biological father if he has failed to 
register.387  The birth mother’s rights could also be violated if the judge 
 
 377.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1042. 
 378.  See id.  However, there are jurisdictional issues regarding whether a state has personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident father and whether such notice satisfies constitutional requirements.  
Id. 
 379.  See id. at 1047. 
 380.  See id. at 1048. 
 381.  See National Registry, supra note 176, at 309. 
 382.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1049. 
 383.  See id.  Furthermore, this affirmative action by the putative father means the mother is not 
required to find the putative father to tell him about the pregnancy or adoption, which many men 
assume the birth mother will do.  See National Registry, supra note 176, at 310. 
 384.  Nolan, supra note 170, at 322. 
 385.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1050.  It is questionable whether sexual 
intercourse alone is sufficient to constitute notice.  Id. at 1049–50. 
 386.  Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 250–51 (1983); see also supra notes 144–46 and 
accompanying text.  The main result of Lehr was that statutes must treat mothers and fathers alike 
when they are similarly situated, but if the father has not assumed parental responsibilities, then the 
notice requirements of putative father registries are constitutional.  See Toward a Database, supra 
note 110, at 1059–60.  State court decisions usually recognize putative father registries as facially 
constitutional, though most also recognize that the registries can be unconstitutional as applied to 
certain cases.  Id. at 1060. 
 387.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1053. 
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forces her to name the father.388  Furthermore, a national registry may require 
the federal government to give funds to the states to create and maintain 
registries that are compatible.389  Although a national putative father registry 
has its flaws, national legislation may be the only effective way to solve 
waiver and jurisdictional problems currently plaguing interstate adoptions 
and the cases of unwed fathers.390 
E.  Amendment of the PKPA 
Part of the issue is that both the PKPA and UCCJA give more than one 
basis for jurisdiction in custody cases.391  While this flexibility leaves room 
to act in the best interest of the child, it creates confusion in interpretation 
and application.392  One possible resolution is amendment to the PKPA.393  
This potentially could clear up the definition of home state and custody 
proceeding, as well as clarify jurisdictional requirements.394  One author 
proposes an amendment that would grant jurisdiction solely to the court 
where the adoption petition is filed.395  Other proposals have included 
 
 388.  See id. at 1052–53.  However, almost any law that grants greater legal rights to unwed 
fathers would necessarily disrupt the privacy interests of the mother.  See Parness & Arado, supra 
note 29, at 232. 
 389.  See Toward a Database, supra note 110, at 1038. 
 390.  See id. at 1073. 
 391.  Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 314. 
 392.  See id. at 314–15 (noting “a sort of schizophrenic aura about these laws”). 
 393.  See DeMelis, supra note 65, at 1372.  There are those who argue against further federal 
legislation.  See Hoff, supra note 104, at 299.  With regard to the UCCJEA, Hoff urges Congress to 
study the UCCJEA and avoid enacting new “legislation that would create new federal-state tensions, 
undermining the gains made by this Act.”  Id.  However, the need for further legislation in the 
adoption context may remain, because “the exclusion of adoption proceedings from the UCJEA [sic] 
definition of ‘custody proceedings’ leaves adoption in something of a jurisdictional wilderness 
without sufficiently clear trail markers.”  The Mobile Family, supra note 82, at 112.  Others still 
have argued that states adopting a modified UCCJA would be more effective than amendment to the 
PKPA.  See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 942. 
 394.  See DeMelis, supra note 65, at 1372.  Custody proceeding could be explicitly defined to 
exclude adoptions, removing some confusion, but then there would be a void in the law for resolving 
jurisdictional issues in adoption cases.  See Waller, supra note 83, at 302.  The home state provision 
could be amended to allow jurisdiction if the child has lived in the state “a majority of the time” 
since birth.  Id. at 303. 
 395.  See Crawford, supra note 74, at 131.  This scholar further proposes that if an adoption 
petition has not been filed, then the court where a custody contestant files first has jurisdiction.  Id.  
Such an amendment would have denied Utah jurisdiction in J.M.W., because the birth father filed the 
custody case in Virginia before the adoption petition was filed in Utah.  J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re 
Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702, 704 (Utah 2011). 
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granting jurisdiction to the court that is in the child’s best interests396 and 
focusing on the home state of the biological parents.397  However, as scholars 
have commented, “[c]ourts will invariably interpret the same legislation in 
differing ways, depending on the policy seen as paramount.”398  
Furthermore, there remains the fact “the courts seem to favor litigants who 
reside in the forum.”399 
Some have called for repeal of the UCCJA and PKPA, allowing courts 
to focus on the individual cases instead of interpretation of statutes.400  
However, the PKPA has been successful to some degree, and, in our 
increasingly mobile society, the need for uniform legislation is even greater 
for interstate custody battles.401  As an alternative type of amendment, 
members of Congress have proposed making interstate parental kidnapping a 
crime, in contrast to the current parental exemption in the kidnapping 
statute.402  While this provision was rejected in the final draft of the PKPA, 
international parental kidnapping has since been made a federal crime,403 
perhaps making amendment appropriate for interstate kidnapping cases.404  
 
 396.  See Crawford, supra note 74, at 133.  This proposal eliminates the uncertainty in interpreting 
the home state provision of the PKPA.  Id. at 133–34.  However, it is highly subjective and likely to 
produce varying results as courts are reluctant to cooperate with each other.  Id. at 134. 
 397.  See Waller, supra note 83, at 306–07.  This would be more logical than focusing on the 
adoptive parents.  Id. at 307.  However, under Waller’s proposal, this does not resolve disputes if the 
biological parents are from two competing states.  Under Charlow’s proposal, if the parents live in 
two states, jurisdiction is granted to the state where one parent currently lives and both parents were 
last residents together, if it exists, or else wherever a case was first filed.  Charlow, supra note 61, at 
314.  Another issue with this proposal is minimum contacts problems in establishing personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident.  Id. at 315. 
 398.  Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 374; see also Charlow, supra note 61, at 324 
(“[A]s long as the substantive rules for custody determinations remain so vague that it is simple to 
justify awarding custody to either parent in almost any case, no jurisdictional statute will solve the 
problem of child snatching.”). 
 399.  See Charlow, supra note 61, at 313. 
 400.  See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 851 (repeal would “eliminate the superfluous delays and 
transaction costs that impede the courts’ search for justice in individual child custody cases”).  
Others who do not believe the PKPA should apply to adoptions call to modify it “to exclude 
interstate ‘stranger’ adoption from the general jurisdictional dictates.”  See Crawford, supra note 74, 
at 130. 
 401.  See DeMelis, supra note 65, at 1373. 
 402.  See Estin, supra note 359, at 304.  Although one of the goals of the PKPA and UCCJA was 
to prevent child snatching, it remains to be seen how effective they have been in that area.  See 
Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 70, at 362.  The UCCJA specifically allows a court to 
decline jurisdiction in the event of wrongful removal, but it also allows the court to exercise 
jurisdiction if it is in the best interest of the child.  UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 8, 9 U.L.A. 1 
(1968).  That is not to say there will not be dangers in making parental kidnapping a criminal 
offense.  See The Rights of Children, supra note 47, at 505–06.  For instance, there are concerns with 
prosecuting the wrong parent and that prosecution would only cause more turmoil in the life of the 
child.  Id. at 506. 
 403.  18 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006). 
 404.  See Estin, supra note 359, at 305. 
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Still others believe the PKPA is working just fine and only needs time for 
issues to be resolved.405  However, “Other commentators believe that such 
optimism in the success of the PKPA is misplaced and that courts continue 
to assert jurisdiction when they think it is appropriate, crafting a judicial 
argument to ignore or evade the PKPA.”406  The Utah Supreme Court’s 
decision in J.M.W. is one such instance of the court crafting a way to obtain 
jurisdiction in spite of the proceeding concurrently pending in Virginia, 
where the child was born and the parents were residents.407 
F.  Proposed Solution 
Of these proposed solutions, Supreme Court review of these 
interpretations has the most potential to resolve conflicting views and ensure 
that the PKPA is applied uniformly.408  With a single decision the Supreme 
Court could definitively state whether the jurisdictional provision of the 
PKPA refers to subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore not waivable, or 
is more akin to territorial jurisdiction and considered waived if not raised in 
the lower court.409  Interpreting the PKPA to find that jurisdiction is not 
waivable would support the goals of the PKPA to encourage courts to 
inquire into custody proceedings that may be pending in other states.410  
With today’s technology, courts are in a better position to make this 
determination than the unwed father, who may not even know of the 
existence of the PKPA.411  This Comment urges the Supreme Court to take 
up review of a case and eliminate the years of uncertainty that have occurred 
since the passage of the PKPA.412 
In the alternative, amendment to the PKPA may also be a viable 
solution.  This would not be as advantageous as Supreme Court review 
because inevitably the newly amended statute would suffer from various 
 
 405.  See Roger M. Baron, Federal Preemption in the Resolution of Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Disputes, 45 ARK. L. REV. 885, 911–12 (1993).  Although Baron’s article was written in 1993, many 
of the issues in interpretation then present are still present today.  However, other authors agree that 
the UCCJA and PKPA have reduced widespread jurisdictional competition.  See Atwood, supra note 
52, at 369. 
 406.  DeMelis, supra note 65, at 1338.  Ultimately, it is difficult to measure the success of the 
PKPA, because success is best determined by cases not brought.  Id. at 1338–39. 
 407.  See id. 
 408.  See supra notes 345–49 and accompanying text. 
 409.  See supra notes 346–47 and accompanying text. 
 410.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 411.  See supra note 383 and accompanying text. 
 412.  See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text. 
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interpretations, leading to more calls for clarification.413  However, a well-
crafted amendment that specifically addresses the current waiver issues 
under the PKPA may reduce some ambiguity.  While allowing for a federal 
cause of action has potential to be of some assistance in preventing 
conflicting decrees, the dangers of flooding the federal court system with 
new cases and getting federal courts involved in matters traditionally left to 
the states likely outweigh the benefits of this option.414  Any uniform 
legislation, such as the UAA or UCCJEA, is inherently subject to various 
versions passed by states and discrepancies in interpretation and 
application.415  A national putative father registry has potential to protect the 
rights of unwed fathers to some degree but would not eliminate many cases 
of custody disputes wherein the unwed father is not aware of the registry or 
fails to meet its requirements.416 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
While no single one of these proposed solutions may solve all of the 
problems under the PKPA and fully protect the rights of unwed fathers, 
thirty years of uncertainty in case law is too much.  As shown by the 
opposing views in J.M.W.417 and Ex parte D.B.,418 both decided in the last 
five years, courts continue to misapply this statute and fail to protect the 
interests of unwed fathers who may be capable of raising their children and 
desire to do so.  Ultimately, something needs to be done to allow interstate 
adoption disputes to be resolved without producing headline news stories.419  
While it may be too late for John to get back the daughter he so desperately 
wants to raise, he still has a chance on appeal to the Supreme Court.420  If it 
is too late for John, one can only hope that his struggle will spur others to 
action to find a solution that is in the best interest of all the parties involved.  
Jurisdiction under the PKPA should not be waivable, and parties should be 
able to raise it on appeal.421  Whatever the solution may be, “[c]hild custody 
jurisdictional decisions must balance a need for flexibility with a desire for 
certainty and finality.”422  To a certain degree, “[i]t matters less which court 
takes jurisdiction, but that the courts of the several states concerned join in 
 
 413.  See supra note 398 and accompanying text. 
 414.  See supra note 352 and accompanying text. 
 415.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 416.  See supra note 383 and accompanying text. 
 417.  J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702 (Utah 2011). 
 418.  975 So. 2d 940 (Ala. 2007). 
 419.  See supra notes 1, 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 420.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 421.  See supra notes 293–308 and accompanying text. 
 422.  DeMelis, supra note 65, at 1376. 
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the effort and act in partnership to bring about the best possible solution for 




 423.  See Legislative Remedy, supra note 47, at 1243. 
 *  J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University, 2013; B.S. in Chemistry, University of Kansas, 
2010.  I thank my family and friends for all their support.  Thanks to Pepperdine Law Review for 
their hard work. 
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